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Private Legislation and the Duty To ReadBusiness Run by IBM Machine, the Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards
Stewart Macaulay*
I. IITODUCrION
"It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called
upon to abide by its conditions, say that he did not read it when he
signed it, or did not know what it contained."' This rallying cry often
is sounded in contracts and restitution opinions. Sometimes it makes
such good sense that it is axiomatic. Yet in common with all grand
slogans, there are situations where it just doesn't fit. For example,
where the one who signs cannot read and has reason to trust another
who tricks him by misreading the document, most courts have thought2
that the limits of the duty to read and understand have been reached.
Undoubtedly courts would find other boundaries to the principle, if
asked to do so. For example, a company that manufactures paper
uses a purchase order form printed on gray paper. On the back are
a number of terms and conditions printed in such light gray ink that
they can be seen only by holding the paper at an angle to the light.
Clearly, if a court were ever to enforce any of these terms and conditions, it would be marching to some other ideology than "choice,"
even "choice" in one of its more extreme definitions. More difficult
are the cases where the words are there in a form more easily read
and understood but where the probabilities are very great that only
the most suspicious will discover and translate them correctly. This
is often true of printed form "contracts" and procedures for using
them which are produced by large corporations to govern what to
them are routine transactions. 4 As we know, often these organizations
attempt to use contract ideology to legislate privately; sometimes successfully, sometimes not. How then should we decide that one does
or does not have a duty to read and understand?
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin; Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences, 1966-67. A.B., 1952, L.L.B., 1954, Stanford University.
1. Sanger v. Dun, 47 Wis. 615, 620, 3 N.W. 388, 389 (1879).

2. See, e.g., Bixler v. Wright, 116 Me. 133, 100 Atl. 467 (1917).
3. I obtained this purchase order in my survey of business practices related to contracts problems. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 Am.SocioLo=xc,. REv. 55 (1963).
4. See generally Note, 63 HAIv. L. REv. 494 (1950).
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This comment5 will consider the "duty to read"-and understandand attempt to highlight many of the important policy considerations
that hide behind this slogan. I will look at some of the common situations where the idea is found, at the wide variety of possible goals
that the legal system might pursue in these situations, and at some of
the consequences of the choices that are made. Finally, I will consider a specific case-the responsibility for misuse of lost or stolen
credit cards in light of the typical lack of warning given by issuers
of these cards-as an example of the analysis suggested.
II. EXAMPLES

OF THE

DUTY To

READ IN RESTITUTION AND CONTRACT

The duty to read and understand can appear in many areas. When
we survey some of them and note that courts at times require this kind
of self-reliance to uphold written documents while at other times forget
any such duty and overturn writings without a complete explanation,
we have good reason to suspect a complex policy decision is lurking
in this simple slogan. Most clearly of interest in a symposium on
restitution is the operation of the duty to read as a defense to rescission or reformation for fraud or various types of mistake. For example,
in The Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Schroeder;6 a manufacturer sued a farm
equipment dealer for the price of machinery that had been delivered.
The dealer sought to defend by asserting he was induced to sign the
written contract by fraudulent representations as to its contents. The
jury found for the dealer, but its judgment was set aside by the trial
court and judgment was entered for the manufacturer. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin affirmed, stressing the failure of the dealer to read
the contract when there had been nothing to prevent him from doing
so. On other occasions, that court has stressed its counter-rule-one
need not read where he has been tricked or "lull[ed] .. .into a feeling
of security." Even without stressing such a counter-rule, in journal
Co. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.,8 the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin affirmed an order overruling an insurer's demurrer
to a bill for reformation of an insurance policy filed by the publisher
of the Milwaukee Journal. The newspaper alleged it had asked the
insurance company for a policy which would cover accidents when the
Journars trucks were carrying newspapers and also when they were
5. I view this as a comment rather than as an article. Cases are cited as illustrations
and examples rather than exhaustively. Moreover, most of the examples are Wisconsin
cases. I gathered them for teaching purposes, and so they are available. Also they are
the law of a particular state rather than cases picked at random to prove a point. As
such they illustrate the tensions between policies that exist in this area.
6. 108 Wis. 109, 84 N.W. 14 (1900).
7. Lotter v. Knospe, 144 Wis. 426, 429, 129 N.W. 614, 615 (1911).
8. 188 Wis. 140, 205 N.W. 800 (1925).
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used to take newsboys to recreational events. The actual policy issued
covered the trucks only when they were used to haul newspapers.
There was an accident where several newsboys were injured and the
insurance company asserted it was not liable. The insurance company
argued that the journal had a duty to read the policy issued, and
relied on the long line of Wisconsin duty-to-read-and-understand cases.
The court distinguished them, stressing that (1) the assured has little
or nothing to say concerning the form of the insurance contract, (2)
in common practice the assured informs the agent of the coverage
needed and leaves it to the agent to obtain the right policy, and (3)
in many cases a reading of the policy would not be enlightening to
the assured because of the technical language used. While we can
see a number of differences in the facts of the two cases, the attitudes
toward self-reliance reflected in the opinions are not consistent.
One can also view these problems in the context of the parol evidence rule. The "model" parol evidence case involves an attempt by
one party to show that his view of the agreement is not reflected in a
written contract "intended by the parties" to be the final expression
of their bargain. Sometimes the reason that the document fails to
correspond to the view of one party as to the deal he actually made is
that he failed to read or understand the writing. For example, in
another Wisconsin decision, 9 a seller of nursery stock sued the buyer
on a written contract. The buyer attempted to show that the actual
agreement between him and the seller's salesman was that the buyer
need not take all of the stock if he did not want it and that the salesman would plant the stock. The printed form contract which the
buyer signed mentioned neither of these things. The court found that
there was insufficient evidence of fraud to provide the exception to
the parol evidence rule that would allow proof of the oral agreement.
The buyer was an instructor at Lawrence College and the court commented, "we have here the simple and altogether too frequent case
of an intelligent man asking the court to protect him against the wrong
of another merely because he failed to take the few moments of time
that would have enabled him to protect himself."10 More recently,
the Wisconsin court reached the opposite conclusion where a seller
had attempted to draft its form contract to gain the protection of the
parol evidence rule against liability for the statements of its representatives." Seller sold home siding to buyer, and seller's president said it
would not rust or crack. Three years later the siding rusted and
cracked. The written contract contained no warranty and provided
9. Knight & Bostwick v. Moore, 203 Wis. 540, 234 N.W. 902 (1931).
10. Id. at 543, 234 N.W. at 903.
11. Anderson v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 67 N.W.2d 853

(1955).
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"The Company prohibits the making of any promises, or representations, unless it is inserted in writing in this agreement before sign-

ing."' 2 The court refused to give effect to the "integration clause" and
quoted a Massachusetts opinion:

As a matter of principle it is necessary to weigh the advantages of
certainty in contractual relations against the harm and injustice that result
from fraud. In obedience to the demands of a larger public policy the law
long ago abandoned the position that a contract must be held sacred regardless of the fraud of one of the parties in procuring it. No one advocates
a return to outworn conceptions. The same public policy that in general
sanctions the avoidance of a promise obtained by deceit strikes down all
attempts to circumvent that policy by means of contractual devices. In the
realm of fact it is entirely possible for a party knowingly to agree that no
representations have been made to him, while at the same time believing
and relying upon representations which in fact have been made and in fact
are false but for which he would not have made the agreement. To deny
this possibility is to ignore the frequent instances in everyday experience
where parties accept, often without critical examination, and act upon agreements containing somewhere within their four comers exculpatory clauses
in one form or another, but where they do so, nevertheless, in reliance upon
the honesty of supposed friends, the plausible and disarming statements of
salesmen, or the customary course of business. To refuse relief would result
in opening the door to a multitude of frauds and in thwarting the general
policy of the law.13

Again one can supply possible factual distinction between the nursery
stock and the home-siding cases, but the entire thrust of the two
opinions is inconsistent. Certainly the buyer of home-siding could
have protected himself by getting a guaranty in writing while the

buyer of nursery stock probably had no particular reason to distrust
the salesman who promised a lot in order to close the deal. Why then

did the home-siding buyer win and the nursery stock buyer lose?
We can find other examples of the presence or absence of the duty
to read in the area somewhat grandly called contracts against public
policy. For example, in O'Callaghanv. Waller & Beckwith Realty

Co.,'4 an injured tenant tried unsuccessfully to overturn an exculpatory
clause in a standard form apartment lease that relieved the landlord

from liability for damages for personal injury caused by its negligence.

The majority opinion, in effect, stressed that the tenant had not recognized the risk allocation made by the lease and had not tried to bargain

for a modification. 15 Again, one can produce a counter-example. In
the famous Henningsen case, 16 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
12. Id. at 459, 67 N.W.2d at 856.
13. Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 170, 182, 31 N.E.2d 551, 558 (1941).

14. 15 111. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1959).
15. Id. at 439-40, 155 N.E.2d at 547.
16. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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that a buyer of a new car was not bound by Automobile Manufacturers
Association Uniform Warranty which, if read carefully and properly
translated, disclaims all liability for personal injury for breach of warranty. One of the grounds of the opinion was that it was unreasonable
to expect a new car buyer to see the limitation and understand it.
The buyer had not read the critical two paragraphs on the back of the
purchase contract, but his failure here was not fatal.
Finally, one can produce an example of a potentially harsh duty to
read from the Uniform Commercial Code. As a practical matter,
section 2-207 appears to require the sales departments of manufacturers to read all purchase orders carefully or be bound to a sweeping warranty obligation far beyond that typically assumed in manufacturing industry. If a seller fails to read and understand that the
quotation form and the purchase order have conflicting provisions on
warranties, as is very likely, the Code provides that conduct by
the parties that recognizes a contract will create one-for example,
by starting production. Then the terms of the contract as to those
items on which they disagree will be filled in by the Code. Unfortunately for sellers, the Code grants much broader warranty protection
to the buyer than almost any industrial seller will ever offer. Such
sellers only expect to replace or repair defective goods; the Code
talks of consequential damages. This problem is critical in many
industries where the quantity of the daily flow of purchase orders
and the burden of hiring people trained to analyze warranty provisions make the impact of the statute serious. 17 This too is a duty to
read with a vengeance; one can only wonder if its imposition is anything more than a mistake prompted by a lack of data on the battle
of the forms problem.

III. Tim UNDEaLYwG FAcroBs
A. General Considerations
It is fairly easy to spin out examples of where the duty to read
and understand does and does not take hold. Moreover, some of the
relevant dimensions seem obvious. Assuming an arms-length bargain
between businessmen who are experienced risk-takers, one of them
should not be able to disappoint the other's expectations and likely
or actual reliance by asserting, "Oh, but I didn't read the contract."
The signed document is too useful a form for signaling the closing of
a deal to allow such a defense without very strong reasons for upsetting the transaction. Moreover, the magic of the act of signing is
17. I discussed this problem in Macaulay, The Use and Nonuse of Contracts in the
Manufacturing Industry, 9 PRac. LAW. 13, 19-27, 35-36 (Nov. 1963).
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well-known; and usually there is reason to assume that the deal was
set as written since typically the one does not know of the other's
failure to read and understand. On the other hand, at some point there
seems good reason to ignore a written contract procured by trickery.
Rational planning and risk assumption would not be served by enforcing the part of a contract written in lemon juice which could only
be read over the heat of a candle when the one signing had not been
informed of the secret. Some business forms and the ways they are
used are almost this bad. There is some danger that a judge, temporarily bereft of his common sense, could apply the duty-to-read slogan
to what really is close to an invisib. ink case and enforce the document as written. It is easy to be swept up in the moralistic attitude
of self-reliance in situations where this is demanding conduct more
properly classified as paranoid.
B. An Organizationof Substantive Contract and Legal System Policies
1. The Dimensions of the Substantive Policies.-While it is hard
to disagree with this quick explanation of the duty to read and understand, I think much more is involved in the kinds of cases that were
offered as examples. The first step toward judgments about the proper
results in these cases is to make explicit the major policy considerations necessarily involved. An analytical scheme I find helpful calls
for first separating out the substantive policies that contract and restitution may serve and then identifying at least some of the goals related
to the proper or efficient operation of the legal system. 18 For example,
18. These classifications were first worked out in Macaulay, Restitution in Context,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 1133 (1959); Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts,
13 STr. L. REv. 812 (1961). Recently my colleague John Hetherington refined these
classifications in his article, Trends in Enterprise Liability: Law and the Unauthorized
Agent, which is to appear in the Stanford Law Review. I learned much from his article.
My colleague Lawrence M. Friedman has dealt with the problem of more or less
generalized rules in FRmDmAN, CONTRACT LAW u'l AmERICA (1965), and in Friedman,
Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 751
(1965). In Contract Law in America, he describes a continuing trend from abstract
rules toward standards that allow the judges to look at the nuances of each case. In my
terms, this progression is from rigorous market functioning rules to either transactional
or relief-of-hardship approaches. In Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written
Documents, he discusses "mandatory" and "discretionary" rules which is one of the
dimensions of my classification. Both of the Friedman pieces are of major importance.
Both of us owe a good deal to Max Weber.
Social planning policy tends to be carried out by legislation removing a whole area
from the domain of contract law-areas "spin off" for special treatment such as labor
law or occupational licensing. This process is the major theme of the Friedman book,
and one that is developed brilliantly. For my comments on the possible relevance of
contracts ideas after an area has been removed and given special treatment, soe
Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporationand Those
Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and the Legal SystemPart II, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 740, 848-50.
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we might want our legal system to aid the operation of the insurance
industry in order to minimize premium costs (a substantive policy),
but we also might want our legal system, insofar as reasonably possible, to reflect the policy choices of a community consensus or those
made by an elected legislature rather than those of an appointed
judge (a system policy).
Substantive policies primarily can be classified on two dimensions.
The first concerns a choice of a market or non-market orientation,
in which contract law and restitution can either (a) be tools to facilitate the operation of a market economy-focusing on the needs of
those exchanging goods, services, labor and capital or (b) serve to
blunt the impact of the unregulated market by refusing to recognize
some socially undesirable business practices or by giving aid to people
or groups seeking to get out from under onerous contracts. The second
dimension concerns the approaches by which contract law and restitution can proceed, tending toward either (a) relatively precise general
rules or (b) a case-by-case approach. 19 This classification yields four
primary categories which must be explained in some detail. The
categories, and their somewhat arbitrary names, can be represented
as follows:
market goals

other than market goals

Generalizing
approach ("rules")

market functioning
policy

social (or economic)
planning policy

Particularistic
approach ("Caseby-case")

transactional
policy

relief-of-hardship policy

a. Market functioning policy calls for rules of general application
in relatively specific terms which minimize (but never eliminate)
the creative role of judge and jury or administrators. Predictable law
is to be preferred to results that satisfy in particular cases. Thus
the parties can consider the impact of contract law both in planning
19. Of course, my transactional and market functioning categories differ from the
orthodox learning about the meeting of the minds (subjective theory) and the objective
theory of contracts. I would view a meeting of the minds approach as entirely a nonmarket approach; it usually operates as a rationalization for relief-of-hardship. Moreover, there are many kinds of objective theories which fall on the scale that ranges from
transactional to market functioning. At one extreme, an objective theory can mean that
a contract neither party intended but both appear to have made will be enforced. At
the other extreme, transactional policy can call for imposing liability on one who has,
without using due care, misled another by his language and conduct, even though the
careless person did not "intend" to make a contract. As is apparent from this discussion, my categories are not dichotomies but extreme points on a range: a given rule or
standard is more or less, say, transactional or market functional, or more or less, say,
transactional or based on relief-of-hardship.

1058
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their bargains and in settling disputes. Legal results will not turn
on vague abstractions such as "good faith" but on specific conduct
such as signing a contract. In addition to certainty, the rules should
tend to reward rational assessment of risks in the market and penalize
unbusiness-like conduct. One can usefully identify at least three
products of market functioning policy: increased self-reliance, rewards to the crafty, and advantages to the operation of bureaucratic
organizations.
The duty to read in a fairly strict form carries out the substantive
goal. The legal system should enforce contracts "as written" and
ignore pleas that one party did not read or understand, that the
parties agreed that some of the written terms would not apply or
that additional ones which were never reduced to writing would apply, and that the words used should be read in some unusual fashion,
or in light of some general abstraction such as "reasonableness." On
the basis of common sense but not much evidence, some have assumed that this tack will promote self-reliance. If one knows he
will be legally bound to what he signs, he will take care to protect
himself (or so it is said). And this would be a good thing. People
will recognize risks, allocate them in their bargains and plan to deal
with them rationally. As a result, more bargains will approach the
economists' ideal where both leave the bargaining table in a better
position than when the negotiations began. Moreover, disputes during
the life of the transaction should tend to be minimized since the process of reading and understanding should make clear who is to do
what and who is to take what loss if a particular risk occurs. Also
where the legal result is clearly that documents will mean what they
say, there is less chance that in settlement negotiations one party's
rights must be discounted because of the risk of what a jury might
do or because of delay.
Such rules reward those who plan and are careful. In one view
those who can drive the best bargains, short of gross fraud, are entitled
to their winnings. Perhaps one who can slip into a contract with terms
highly favorable to himself which are undetected by the other party,
is to be praised for his skill rather than censured. This is just good
salesmanship. In this view, a bargain is not an exchange of mutual
advantage but a game where each party is to maximize his own
gains at the expense of the other. Some may feel that the ability
to do well in this game is a skill to be rewarded. A strict duty-toread rule often will help supply this reward.
Another product of market functioning policy-advantages to the
operation of bureaucratic organizations-often derives from people
being treated as if they had read and understood a written contract
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even when it is probable they have not done so. Large economic
organizations frequently promulgate rules to govern their exchanges
with other organizations and individuals. Typically these rules are
cast, or can be cast, in the form of a contract. The other unit's representative or the other individual signs a printed form document or
accepts a contractual symbol (say, delivery of a document or goods)
although he has little chance or incentive to read, understand, bargain
to change the rules or do any or all of these things. Larger firms
operate this way for a number of reasons. They must deal through a
corps of agents in a myriad of transactions. As a result, there is a need
to standardize and formalize procedures. On one hand, the large
organization must control its agents who deal with the outside world
and limit their power to "give the company away." These agents are
under many pressures to treat their customers as individuals and tailor
the particular deal to suit their customers' needs; most obvious is the
pressure to make sales to earn commissions or promotions. Also, "the
customer is always right" in the salesman's world. A rigid form
contract which the customer must sign without alteration often is
thought to be an efficient way to exercise control over salesmen. The
customer is "on notice" of the salesman's limited authority, and the
firm wants to avoid being legally bound to expectations its salesman
has created by his conduct that are inconsistent with company policy.
On the other hand, the written document signed by the customer
becomes the obligation within the larger organization because of
the problems of internal communication. It specifies what must be
produced or shipped, and it indicates the full extent of future payments to be received and contingent obligations assumed. If a salesman has made a promise inconsistent with the formal written contract which is highly standardized, it is difficult to communicate this
to those who must perform and to those who must make plans based
on cash flow and risk assumption. Even if the inconsistent promise
is communicated, it poses a problem for a rational bureaucratic organization which tends to thrive on routine. Large organizations
are helped if they can control and plan their exposure to risks; if
they can do so, their accounting and pricing will be more accurate,
and they will not have to set up large reserves to cover a host of
unpredictable contingencies. Arguably, this kind of certainty will
foster their activities in the market which in turn should yield more
jobs and more products at lower prices. A rather strict duty to
read, rather than attacking the balance of economic power in the
society, supports the operations of large organizations that have this
power. This tends to promote rational business affairs, whatever the
impact on the individual who assumed he could rely on what he was
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told rather than what he signed. Thus, the farm machinery dealer
and the college instructor buying nursery stock in two of the cases
we discussed, were asking for individual treatment where relatively
large organizations on the other side of the transactions wanted to
standardize. The two judicial opinions insisting on a duty to read
and understand are consistent with this kind of bureaucratic policy.
The reformation of the Milwaukee Journal's insurance policy is not;
it turned on fault and the risk of reliance-transactional ideas.
Usually these bureaucratic considerations are coupled with the
self-reliance idea-the large organization can deal through standardized forms and the prudent individual will protect himself by reading
and taking appropriate action-although at times the likelihood of
self protection is slim indeed. Occasionally, bureaucratic policy is
coupled with a requirement designed to help self-reliance. For example, a Virginia statute demands that a written contract be set in
a certain size type to be legally enforceable, 20 the Uniform Commercial
Code requires some warranty disclaimers to be conspicuous to be
1
effective.

2

b. Transactional policy, the second policy category, also seeks to
aid the operation of the market, but with a case-by-case strategy
rather than by rules that ignore particular circumstances. The courts
ought to take steps to carry out the particular transaction brought
before them-they should discover the bargain-in-fact and enforce it
with appropriate remedies cut to fit the facts of the case. If this discovery is not possible, the court should work out a result involving
the least disruption of plans and causing the least amount of reliance
loss in light of the situation at the time of the dispute. In short,
courts should seek to implement the "sense of the transaction," and
thus solve the problem in the particular case in market termsassumption of the risk, reasonable reliance, and so on.
Transactional policy calls for a duty to read and understand only
where the one who has failed to do this is responsible for misleading
the other into believing that the document has been read and approved or that the careless one is willing to sign and assume the
risk of whatever might be found in the document. Suppose seller
sends buyer an offer quoting a price in a letter which also very
clearly spells out a number of conditions the seller says are most
important to him. The buyer reads the first few sentences of the
letter and the price quoted but not the seller's important conditions.
The buyer writes on the bottom margin of the seller's letter, "We
accept your offer," and signs it; he then mails this back to the seller
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4 (1950).
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2).

1966 ]

DUTY TO READ

1061

who begins production of the items in question. The buyer later
wants to back out and asserts he did not read the seller's conditions
and would not have agreed to them if he had. The buyer has been
negligent in conveying his agreement, resulting in dissappointed plans
and at least the probability of a good deal of reliance loss. A court
following a transactional approach would treat the buyer as if he had
read and understood the seller's letter. But the decision would turn
on the rather extreme facts of the case-the buyer's communication
was careless and caused either very probable or actual injury.
Perhaps more often transactional policy will call for overturning
or modifying a written document (by reforming or construing it)
in the light of the bargain-in-fact of the parties.22 While a case can
be made for self-reliance, part of decent social and business conduct
is trust. In many negotiation situations all of the pressures push for
friendly gestures rather than a suspicious line-by-line analysis of the
writing. The buyer of home siding can believe the president of the
home remodeling company when he says his siding will not rust or
crack; the buyer does not have to parse the text of the lengthy and
technical printed form and spot the integration clause at his peril.
In cases such as this, the writing was drafted to run counter to the
likely agreement-in-fact. If a court is seeking the actual sense of
the transaction, it will not let such a writing get in its way.
It seems to me that the growing English doctrine of fundamental breach23 is an expression of transactional policy. There,
judicial enforcement of clauses limiting liability is denied when enforcement would be inconsistent with the "core" or primary purposes
and obligations of the contract. For example, a seller cannot agree
in the typed part of a contract to deliver a machine which will produce so many units a minute to a certain tolerance and then successfully disclaim all liability for the failure of his machine to perform by
printing boiler-plate clauses on the back of a form he uses. From
the standpoint of the particular transaction, assertion of the disclaimer clause is little more than trickery. In this kind of case, market
functioning policy would call for enforcing the contract as written;
transactional policy demands enforcement of the contract-in-fact so
that the buyer's reasonable expectations are honored.
22. Comment 1 to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 states, "The principle is
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not of disturbance of

allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." This clearly pushes for a
transactional approach in applying the concept "unconscionable contract or clause."
It is highly ambiguous as to whether or not it contemplates also a relief-of-hardship

approach. The "superior bargaining power" reference indicates that it does not, but
then what is the meaning of "oppression"?
23. See Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50
VA. L. BEv. 1178 (1964).
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c. Social planning policies can be reflected in contracts and restitution, as well. In one sense, rather than enforcing the bargain that
was made, in this third type of policy the courts will enforce the
bargain which the parties should have made. Conversely, the courts
may refuse to take any action when the actual bargain is found offensive. This policy is something of a catchall, as social planning can
call for a variety of things ranging from wealth redistribution to the
regulation, or even promotion, of particular types of people, industries or transactions. The most obvious examples involve a change
in the market context by removing certain types of bargains from the
kinds that will be enforced by the legal system or by requiring or
prohibiting particular terms in some bargains. Again, this is a generalizing approach stressing specific rules, so it parallels market functioning policy in strategy-but the goals of the two are very different since
social planning policies, by definition, seek to blunt the impact of the
market.
A social planning rule relevant to our topic would be one that
said certain classes of people could not be held to contracts they
signed or accepted, despite their careless failure to read and protect
themselves. One could conceive of a rule protecting such people as
consumers, illiterates, those of limited mental ability or minors. In
effect, the power of a minor to disaffirm even contracts that he has
read and understood is such a rule.24 Since, in theory, the minor cannot guard his own interests, the legal system protects him from his
own carelessness and improvident bargains. Consumers may get
some of the same treatment under Uniform Commercial Code section
2-719's provisions on limiting remedies for breach of warranty; perhaps consumers need not read and protect themselves since limitations of liability for personal injury caused by a breach of warranty
are prima facie unconscionable. It is difficult to offer many examples
of this kind of social planning rule since the legal system has preferred a more case-by-case (relief of hardship) approach, rather
than letting a whole class of people out of certain kinds of contracts.
On the other hand, social planning goals often enter as the price
for following the bureaucratic type of market functioning policy. For
example, the standard fire insurance policy is set by statute in many
states.2 5 One side of the coin involves the setting of terms deemed
fair to the consumer by the legislature-removing the insurance contract from the area of self-reliance and the exercise of market power.
The other side of the coin, however, involves telling insurance companies that if they follow the statute, certain practices have been
24. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS §§ 18, 18B (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1964).
25. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 203.01 (1963).
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validated. An insurance company can know where it stands, and
this certainty may be extremely important to it. The insurers get
certainty at the cost of following fair terms imposed by the legal
system.
d. Relief-of-hardship is the fourth policy. It calls for the legal
system to let one party out of his bargain in exceptional cases where
enforcement would be unduly harsh, or, where the content of the
bargain is in doubt, to place the burden on the party best able to
spread the loss or absorb it. This case-by-case approach is based not
upon considerations of market functioning or protecting actual expectations but upon ethical ideals and emotional reactions to the
plight of the underdog, to pressing an advantage too far, to making
too much profit, or to inequality of resources. To a great extent, this
is the policy that is not expressed openly in contract doctrine, but
courts can construe language and stretch the innocent misrepresentation or mistake doctrines to help out when the facts are particularly
appealing. When done with a deft hand, a relief-of-hardship approach
will leave little trace of a precedent to embarrass the court in the
next case, where the facts are not quite so appealing.
It is hard to offer a pure example of this policy in operation, but
it can be suggested that a good deal of it lurks in the insurance release
cases where a duty to read and understand sometimes is and sometimes is not applied.2 Also the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in several
cases has stressed the lack of education of the person seeking to be
relieved from a written contract he signed or accepted.2 7 On one
hand, this factor tracks with transactional policy and the degree of
care one could expect from a particular individual. Arguably, an
illiterate is not responsible for misleading one who knows the illiterate
cannot read the document he signed. But on the other hand, the party
seeking to uphold the contract, especially the home office of a corporation that deals through salesmen in the field, may have no way
accurately to gauge the education and literacy of the man who signed
the printed form. Its expectations and potential reliance remain
despite the literacy of the man it dealt with. Still the factor may lead
to the overthrow of the written treaty. We can speculate that the
inabiliy to read and understand is correlated with a generally low
26. One of my favorite notes in any casebook is Dawson and Palmer's historical
survey of the Minnesota insurance release cases. In Minnesota, as in other states, sometimes insurance releases stick, but often they do not. See DAwsoN & PALmER, CASES ON
REsT-noN 686-88 (1958). See also Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d
Cir. 1946).
27. See, e.g., Engel v. Van Den Boogart, 255 Wis. 81, 37 N.W.2d 852 (1949);
Lefebvre v. Nickolai, 205 Wis. 115, 236 N.W. 684 (1931). But see Institute of Commercial Art v. Maurice, 272 Wis. 499, 76 N.W.2d 332 (1956).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

EVOL.. 19

socio-economic status, and such people may be the best candidates
for relief-of-hardship in the eyes of many.
e. Overlaps and Interrelationships.-Ofcourse, a great deal of overlap among these policies is possible because they refer to tendencies
rather than pure categories. A particular decision may be justified
by reference to several different policies, both market and non market
in orientation. For example, in Miller v. Stanich,28 a tenant had a
right to renew his lease for five years. He wanted to renew it for
that term, and, in addition, get a right to renew for another five years
after the first renewal term had expired. The landlord's agent told
the tenant that the landlord was unlikely to agree to an additional
renewal term. The tenant, following the adage that "there is no harm
in asking," sent two lease forms to the landlord. One called for the
five-year term to which the tenant was entitled; the other called for
that five years plus an option to renew for an additional five years.
The landlord, who could read only German, took both leases to his
lawyer since they were written in English. The landlord, as predicted,
did not want to give the tenant an option to renew for an additional
five years after the next five year term expired. However, by oversight, the landlord's lawyer filled in the date on the lease form that
contained the option to renew. The landlord took the forms home,
signed the dated lease and sent it to the tenant. Undoubtedly, the
tenant was delighted at his good fortune, but his joy was shortlived.
The landlord discovered his error and demanded that it be corrected.
If we were to apply a strict self-reliance duty to read approach consistent with functional policy, the result would be clear- the landlord
would be bound. And indeed, this was the view of three Justices of
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. But four Justices joined in an
opinion reforming the lease to strip it of the additional option for
a five-year term,29 arguing that the tenant had not "taken any steps
whatever in reliance upon the provision for a five-year extension."30
On one hand, transactional policy claims are weak because of the
unusually low risk of reliance; it seems unlikely that the tenant could
not have found good alternative premises for a term to begin five
years in the future. On the other hand, the balance of hardship and
fault favors the landlord. The majority thought the facts called for
relief, despite the landlord's failure to read and understand.
Even though these policies are interrelated and overlap, the classification suggested here has proved useful. It serves to clarify the
28. 202 Wis. 539, 230 N.W. 47, rev'd on rehearing, 233 N.W. 753 (1930).
29. Miller v. Stanich, 202 Wis. 539, 233 N.W. 753 (1930). The court granted
rescission on the condition that the landlord execute and file a lease in the form and
terms of the lease he intended to deliver.
30. Miller v. Stanich, supra note 28, at 545, 230 N.W. at 49 (dissent).
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issues and separates distinct arguments so that they reinforce each
other rather than confuse matters. The classification also serves aq a
checklist to lessen the chance that a relevant argument will be neglected.
2. The Dimensions of Some Legal System Policies.-In addition to
these substantive goals of contract and restitution, there are also a
number of goals related to one's view of the proper or efficient functioning of the legal system.
a. Pressure on the Docket.-The simplest example is the goal of
preventing the dockets from becoming overcrowded. To the extent
that a person could easily reopen an insurance release, for example,
because he did not read or understand it, and try his claim, an already
crowded personal injury docket could be increased. This would obviously produce problems: the courts would be faced with even
more personal injury cases-a type that in many cities is not handled
well or quickly. More personnel might be required to prevent the
courts from falling even further behind. Moreover, the condition of
the court dockets is a key ploy in the settlement process. Those that
can afford to wait have great advantages in cities where there are
great delays. A claimant's legal rights are less valuable if he does
not have sufficient assets to await trial or cannot borrow. Obviously,
it does not make sense to incur costs of this sort unless the gains in
terms of substantive policies are thought to be great.
b. Accurate Fact Finding.-Another legal system policy clearly
wrapped up in the duty to read and understand is the goal of accurate
fact-finding. Often when a court announces a sweeping duty to read
and confines counter-rules narrowly, one senses that the court is concerned with the likelihood of perjury and the difficulties of adjudicating facts. It is easy to make up a story about one's assumptions that
are contradicted by a written contract. Moreover, appellate judges
might be concerned about jury sympathy playing a role which would
undercut substantive policies calling for the enforcement of written
contracts. For example, several of the Wisconsin duty-to-read cases
involve a buyer who spoke or read only German, seeking to overturn
a contract written in English before a jury that probably was composed of his neighbors and friends. The seller was an outsider to
the community. One can seldom prove that the risk of jury bias was
influential in a court's decision, but one can be suspicious. 31 A promi31. In a number of cases decided between the 1870's and the early 1900's, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin dealt harshly with the defense that the party who wanted
to avoid a written contract spoke or read only German and not English, the language
in which the contract was written. See Deering v. Hoeft, 111 Wis. 339, 87 N.W. 298
(1901); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Schroeder, 108 Wis. 109, 84 N.W. 14 (1900);
German Bank v. Muth, 96 Wis. 342, 71 N.W. 361 (1897); Albrecht v. Milwaukee &
S. Ry., 87 Wis. 105, 58 N.W. 72 (1894); Fuller v. Madison Mut. Ins. Co., 36 Wis.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 19

nent Wisconsin lawyer from a smaller city told me that he feels he
can break most printed-form contracts by inviting the national organization seeking to enforce one to come to his city and face a local
jury. As we move from relatively general rules to case-by-case standards involving particulars, we may increase this jury factor and
promote bargaining at the settlement stage based on jury risk. Some
might think this undesirable. On the other hand, a duty to read
coupled with exceptions largely in the court's control can be useful in
allowing the court to deal with perjury without being forced to label it
as such. But while this tactic may be useful, it carries the costs of
most case-by-case approaches-a loss of predictability and an increased
risk of arbitrariness.
c. Efficacy and Efficiency: What Can Be Done and at What Costs?On another level, the four substantive policies place differing demands
upon the capacity of the legal system to gain information about the
nature of particular problems with which it must deal-the "input"
stage-and the consequences of the existing legal situation and possible alternative courses of action-the "feedback" stage. First, the
problem of inputs of information: a case-by-case approach increases
the demands on the fact-finding process. Transactional policy calls
for a careful assessment of expectations created by the entire exchange situation and of possible reliance losses from opportunities
that might have been taken had the contract in question not been
made. Often one would have to work with tacit assumptions and
implicit understandings based on practices in particular industries.
This is not easy, and there is a great risk of error. Rather than take
this chance, a judge can follow the safety of the written word and
preach about the duty to make it correspond with the bargain in
fact. Relief-of-hardship policy calls for a careful weighing of such
factors as who can best bear the loss, decisions loaded with implicit
value judgements as well as factual issues. From the feedback standpoint a case-by-case approach can be administered to have a relatively less serious impact than a "rules" approach. Each decision need
go no further than handling the dispute between the particular parties. However, the chance of winning in a decision system based on
particular nuances can influence the settlement negotiation process,
and all 'legal rights" then have to be discounted by this factor. Inso599 (1875). But see Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194 (1871). On one hand, these seem
rigorous market functioning policy opinions, but it is likely that there is a good deal of
social planning too. The rule was that the German population of Wisconsin during that
period could not escape written contracts they signed by testifying before a jury composed of fellow German speaking neighbors that the oral deal was different. This served
the social policy of integration-the cases were one more incentive for the German immigrants to learn English and become "Americanized." By 1930, things were different.
See the discussion of Miller v. Stanich in the text at notes 28-30 supra.
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far as there are types of business transactions where the legal enforceability of contracts is important, uncertainty is increased and
claims with some plausibility become worth more. Of course, it is
most difficult for either courts or administrative agencies to assess the
impact of their actions on private dispute settlement. There is little,
if any, systematically obtained knowledge about such matters, and
it would not be easy to study this process if one set out to do so.
An approach based upon rules of relatively specific content makes
a different set of demands on the legal system. One can adopt market
functioning policy as the primary strategy and assume that once the
rules are known it matters little what they are; if the consequences of
their application are substantively offensive to some, the relations
between people and organizations can be arranged by the parties to
avoid the situations covered by the rule or an appeal to the legislature
can be made to carve out a special area to protect a deserving class
of people. Thus, a court could routinely hold a man to a written
contract he signed, overturning only the most extreme forms of deception. Of course, sometimes one can prompt a heated political
discussion by exploring the assumptions involved in this line of
argument. Perhaps some people need protection or relief of hardship. On the other hand, if the legal system is going to do some
social planning, several most difficult, and fairly obvious, input and
feedback problems are presented. Case-finding often is accidental;
a court lacks the chance to legislate about problems not brought
before it, and even a legislature is hampered in discovering some
social problems because of pressure of major issues such as taxation
and budgets. (An administrative agency sometimes can do better
if it is not blocked by political pressure or limited resources.) Moreover, even when a problem is presented for solution, the entire legal
system, and particularly a court, lacks tools to produce data about
both the likely consequences of proposals for change as well as the
community consensus on the right mix of values relevant to the
problem. Moreover, both courts and legislatures often have no way
of discovering the full range of consequences of their past actions;
if a result is sufficiently bad, someone may bring up a new case to
the court or may appear before the legislature. But some attempts
at planning can have impacts that are hard to see or impacts on those
not able to use the legal system effectively. It is difficult to know
exactly what will happen if people need not read certain contracts
or if they must read others as far as the legal system is concerned.
Sometimes the impact would be great; sometimes no one would care.
d. Democratic Ideals as Related to Who Makes Policy and How.Furthermore, the ideal of a democratic government poses some re-
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straint on how free courts or agencies are or should be to decide
cases based upon reaction to particular circumstances or to create
rules based upon social policies not enacted by legislatures and not
endorsed by a wide public consensus. Of course, the practical problem is not one of the right to base decisions on whim or the duty to
apply hard and fast rules that allow no "leeways." The problem is
one of proportion-few if any people call for a judge to decide by taking bribes or flipping coins ("discretion" doesn't mean this), or for
judges to apply mechanically set doctrines of fixed content where
the rule just does not fit. (We also can deny that any such mechanically pure rules exist. It seems doubtful that the duty to read, unless
there is a good excuse, is such a rule.)
Judges are more removed from the electorate than legislators, and
judges have some obligation to remember this before they undertake
social reform through case law. However, given the need to decide
cases, the very nature of law forces the decision-maker to choose between one policy and another in many situations. Our traditions
impose some limits on the frame from which a judge may choose-for
example, he is not to reward his friends and punish his enemies. Yet
these limitations often are not decisive. Within the area of acceptable
decisions there are judgments to be made. This is particularly true
of the duty to read and understand situations. Within the common
law tradition one can hold a man to precisely what he signed or turn
in the other direction and talk of his actual expectations and construe
a duty of good faith into the contractual language. Moreover, there
is no manifest, strongly-held public consensus on such questions.
Nonetheless, the allocation of functions within the United States legal
system counsels those officials whose policy choices are more removed
from approval or disapproval by an electorate to remember the nature
of their place in the system. Perhaps this calls for making judgments,
other things being equal, so that the burden of getting them changed
by another unit of government rests on the one practically best able
to present his case there. For example, organized interest groups
usually can take care of themselves before a legislature; individuals
often cannot.
When, then, should there be a duty to read? The problem is one
of balancing the capabilities of and the values we hold about the
legal system against our substantive goals. The Uniform Commercial
Code suggests that it may be helpful to make a rather crude division
into contracts between merchants and all others. It is true that one's
judgement about a duty to read and understand may differ in various
kinds of cases involving various kinds of people. An exchange of
written documents between parties advised by lawyers perhaps calls
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for different treatment than a printed form used by a large corporation
and accepted by a consumer under circumstances where he is unlikely
to read and understand. One can subdivide the categories even further.
Perhaps the documents involved in multi-party financing transactions
should be given far more deference than the conflicting purchase
order and acknowledgement forms so typical of the sale of "shelf"
goods by one manufacturer to another. Perhaps a printed form used
in dealing with relatively high socio-economic status consumers which
reflects a reasonable or customary allocation of risks should be treated
differently from a printed form designed to aid in the exploitation
of the poor. On the other hand, while such a case-type approach has
immediate appeal to most law teachers who cut their teeth on realistic
jurisprudence, it does have real costs if we assume that the legal
enforceability of any large number of contracts really makes a difference to anyone. Instead of supporting the existing allocation of
power in the society, courts, in some if not all of the examples given,
are being asked to protect individuals from the exercise of that
power. Moreover, courts are being asked to plan without much more
than common sense and hunches about the nature of the problem
they are confronting or the likely consequences of their decisions.
And a court's choice may be what we think is the wrong policy in
an area where it has the last word because the doors to the legislature
are closed as a result of the balance of economic and political power
in the situation. No solution is cost free; the best that can be asked
is that our judges and legislators proceed with caution to avoid any
unnecessary costs.
IV.

AN ExAMPLE: THE STOLEN CP -mIT CARD AND
To READ AND UNDERSTAmD

=lE

DUTY

Obviously, the analysis presented to this point does not yield a
clear answer to the question of when should a duty to read and
understand be imposed. My own preference is for an approach treating different kinds of situations differently with a decided bias
towards transactional policy where it is not clearly outweighed by
the other factors. Given this imprecision, an example considered in
some detail seems called for. The one selected is not an earth-shaking
problem, but it involves manageable factual and legal materials and
has some interesting aspects. Thus we turn to the application of the
analysis suggested as applied to the duty to read and understand the
information given the holder of a credit card about his responsibility
for its unauthorized use.a3 Here we have a statute and cases that
32. The holder's liability for charges made with his lost or stolen credit card has been
very popular with the law reviews. See Claflin, The Credit Card-A New Instrument,
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differ in approach, as well as the institutionalized practices of large

organizations that attempt to use the law of contract to allocate the
risk of loss caused by lost or stolen cards. 33 Moreover, the individual

dealing with the large corporation is not likely to be so poor or
illiterate as to present an extreme limiting case.

How does the use of a lost or stolen credit card raise the duty to
read problem? Credit cards are issued by various kinds of large
organizations. Almost all of them today attempt to place the risk
of a misuse of a card on the one to whom it is issued until he notifies
the issuer that the card has been lost or stolen. But the duty to read

and understand takes center stage when we look to see how corporations that issue cards notify the holder of this allocation of risk. In

the past, and even in some cases today, this "term of the contract"
was or is decidedly soft-peddled. For example, until the early 1960's

most oil companies placed a clause to this effect on the back of the
credit card in microscopic type and in language that was not easy to

understand. Another clause proclaimed that retention or use of the
credit card constituted acceptance of a contract based on the con-

ditions printed on the card. Of course, no hint of such terms appeared on the application for the card the holder filled out and signed.

There have been relatively few cases, but the courts have differed
on whether or not the large organizations that issue credit cards

should be allowed to impose their system on credit card holders by
playing with contract concepts in this manner. Originally, those firms

that issued credit cards acted in the context of general common law
principles. The legal and competitive systems have interacted to pro33 CONN. B.J. 1 (1959); Robinson, New Developments in Retail Financing, 8 KAI. L.
REV. 554, 567-74 (1960); 30 ALBANY L. Bnv. 79 (1966); 48 CM
L. REV. 459
(1960); 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 150 (1962); 9 KAN.L. REV. 325 (1961); 22 LA. L. REV.
640 (1962); 18 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 47 (1962); 43 N.C.L. REv. 416 (1965); 35
NonmE DAME LAW. 2-5 (1960); 13 STAr. L. REv. 150 (1960); 109 U. PA. L. REv.
266 (1960); 23 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 125 (1966); 2 U. Prrr. L. REv. 117 (1936);

67 W. VA. L. REv. 145 (1965); 73 YALE L.J. 886 (1964).
It is, or may be, in various jurisdictions a crime to use another's credit card without
authorization. See Katz, Federal Prosecution for the Interstate Transportation of Stolen
Credit Cards, 38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 323 (1966); 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 207 (1962); 7 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 158 (1962).
33. Much, but not all, of what is said in the following discussion was said some time
ago. See, e.g., Isaacs, The Standardization of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 35 (1917);
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUm.
L. REV. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, Common-Law Reform of Consideration: Are There
Measures?, 41 COLUmn. L. REv. 863, 869-71 (1941); Patterson, The Delivery of a Life
Insurance Policy, 33 HAIIv. L. REv. 198 (1919). It is significant that most of the ideas
in these articles are still relevant and worth emphasizing again. Professor Fuller began
one of his classic articles with an apt reference: "Nietsche's observation, that the most
common stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do, retains a discomforting
relevance to legal science." Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:
1, 46 YArE L. J. 52 (1936).
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duce the present situation, both in terms of today's business practices
and today's law. Our substantive contract and legal system variables
can help us sort out the policy threads in the response of the legal
system, and this exercise in turn will highlight the major themes in
the duty to read problems.
A. Context of the Problem
As with any problem it helps to know something of the context in
which it arises. The general history of the credit card can be sketched
rather briefly; its rise probably reflects a basic change in widely-held
values about going into debt, culminating with the charge account
society of the 1960's. Before World War I, some department stores
gave customers a credit coin to identify them as people entitled to
buy on credit. The oil companies introduced credit cards in the 1920's
and 1930's. The Airline Travel card was started in 1936, but its boom
came in the 1950's. In 1950, the general travel and entertainment
card was created by the Diners Club and followed by American Express in 1958 and Carte Blanche in 1959.4 The use of credit cards
has grown tremendously in the last 10 years and has become widespread. Some measure of the size of the credit card business can be
indicated. In July of 1966, American Express cards were held by
1,700,000 people and firms;3 Diners Club cards by about 1,500,000.6
About 556 million dollars was charged on American Express cards in
1965;7 about 400 million dollars on Diners Club cards. 38 American
Express cards are honored by about 6,400 hotels, 10,800 motels,
11,400 restaurants, 16,600 shops and 55,000 gas stations.3 9 In 1960, it
was reported that there were 19,423,000 oil company credit cards outstanding, 40 and that about a quarter of the United States' car-owning
households had one or more oil company cards. 41 Standard of Indiana,
alone, had 3.6 million cards outstanding in 1963.4
Obviously, a complex system had to be developed to handle all this
business. On the seller's side, a service station attendant or a restaurant cashier has to fil out a charge slip, stamp it with the card, get
the customer's signature and send it off to a "home" office. There the
34. For a history of credit cards, see generally N.Y. Times, May 10, 1959, § 3, p. 1,
col. 8, p. 11, cols. 1-3; Wall St. J., July 7, 1960, p. 1, col. 1, p. 4, col. 2; id., Nov. 17,
1958, p. 1, col. 1. See also Aviation Week, Deb. 15, 1958, pp. 38-39, for a history of
the Airline Travel card.
35. Wall St. J., July 15, 1966, p. 5, col. 1.
36. Id., cols. 1-2.
37. Id., col. 1.
38. Id., col. 2.
39. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1965, p. 38, cols. 2, 4.
40. Id., Dec. 19, 1960, p. 38, col. 6.
41. *ibid.
42. Milwaukee J., July 29, 1963, part 2, p. 15, col. 2.
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seller's account must be credited and the card holder's account must
be charged. Periodically, statements must be compiled and mailed.
Finally, in some cases, efforts must be made to collect the bills.
Standard of Indiana, in 1963, estimated that on a routine day over
2 million dollars in credit transactions were handled by its office,
75,000 checks were processed, 85,000 statements were mailed, 30,000
credit cards were issued and 4,000 address changes were made. Six
hundred and fifty people ran the credit center, working in three shifts
to keep up with this flood of paper.43 Obviously, great use of data
processing machinery is made by all issuers of credit cards to help
battle the great number of transactions. But what about the other
side of the system? Who holds a credit card? Airline cards tend to
be held by large corporations which then hand them to their executives. Large corporations also often hold the general travel and
entertainment cards, giving them to their employees who operate on
expense accounts. American Express has described the individual
who will be issued a card, as follows: "Generally speaking, we prefer
incomes over 7,500 dollars, evidence of steady employment, a favorable bank reference and a favorable report from a local credit bureau
in the area where the applicant resides."44 The New York Times reports that the "average card holder is male, married, earns between
10,000 and 20,000 dollars a year, travels frequently and is a college
graduate." 45 On the other hand, there are cards for the less wealthy
and less well-educated. Many banks run local or regional credit card
plans for those with generally lower income than the holders of
American Express, Diners Club or Carte Blanche cards.46 Moreover,
in 1960 a survey run for Look magazine indicated that 53 per cent
of the holders of oil company credit cards had household incomes of
7,000 dollars a year or less.47
Finally by way of background, let us turn to the problems of lost
or stolen cards. Lost or stolen cards are misused by individuals who
see them as a ticket to all the affluent society can offer and by professional criminals who have set up systems of their own to take
advantage of the credit card system.48 A wallet stolen in New York
can yield a fine set of cards that can be in use in Chicago, Miami or
Los Angeles the next day. In 1964, Time reported, "of the 70 million
43. ibid.
44. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1965, p. 38, col. 2.
45. Id. at col. 5.
46. Business Week, Sept. 4, 1965, p. 54; id., Nov. 3, 1962, pp. 65-66.
47. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1960, p. 38, col. 6.
48. See Angus, Don't Lose Your Credit Cards, The American Legion Magazine, May
1964, p. 17; Wylie, Hold On To That Card!, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Mar. 12, 1961, §
6, pp. 6-7; N.Y. Times, May 15, 1966, § 3, p. 1, col. 1; id., May 6, 1966, p. 62, col. 4;
id., Mar. 18, 1960, p. 1, col. 2; Wall St. J., April 26, 1960, p. 1, col. 1, p. 12, col. 3.
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credit cards in circulation in the U.S., no fewer than 1,500,000 are
lost each year, and of these 60,000 have been stolen. Illicit charges
run up on a stolen card are estimated to average 500 dollars. Stealing
credit cards is an increasingly popular crime; dollar losses from their
misuse increased eightfold from 1958 ($266,850) to 1962 ($1,915,000)." 49 Time apparently took its figures from two interviews with
oil company credit managers reported a month before in the American Legion Magazine.50 However, there the average amount charged
on stolen credit cards was reported as 3,500 dollars. 51 Whatever the
consequences, obviously it is easy to lose a credit card. Pockets can
be picked, and one enjoying an evening of the sort made available
by the travel and entertainment cards is likely to be a good target.
How do the large organizations that issue credit cards attempt to
get the holder-is -liable-for-misuse-until-notice-is - sent-to - the-issuer

term into their contract? There is a fairly common pattern. First,
a person who wants a card fills out an application blank, signs it and
sends it to the company. Then if his credit rating satisfies the company, he is sent a 2 inch by 32 inch plastic card along with some
literature welcoming him to the "family." Sometimes the holder of
the card is instructed to sign it; sometimes there is no place for
signature on the card. As late as 1963, the most common approach
to creating a contract was to say nothing about any liability for misuse on the application but to print a clause on the back of the credit
card in exceedingly tiny type stating, for example: "2. Customer
agrees to pay for all purchases made by any person, whether authorized or not, using this card unless and until Shell Oil Company
has received notice that it has been lost or stolen." The contract
was formed, or so the companies would like us to believe, by another
49. Time, June 19, 1964, p. 53. The figures are Time's. If there are 60,000 stolen
cards and the average illicit charge run up on a stolen card is $500, one wonders why
the dollar losses from misuse are only $1,915,000. In 1962, it was reported that "Hilton officials say that in the past two years losses to forgers have been reduced from
$4,000 per week to about $800." (Emphasis added.) Scalza, Strictly on the Cuff, Barrons, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 5. At that time Hilton ran Carte Blanche.
50. See Angus, supra note 48. There are a number of parallels between the Time
and American Legion Magazine articles. Moreover, a credit card insurer mailed out
reprints of the American Legion Magazine article along with its advertising shortly before the Time article appeared. The Time article discussed the policy offered by the
insurer. I assume the Time writer was on the mailing list of the insurer.
51. In order to get an estimate of the number of stolen credit cards that have been
reported to the three travel and entertainment card companies, my research assistant
counted those indicated as stolen in the weekly cancellation bulletins of American Express (bulletin of June 24, 1966), Carte Blanche (bulletin of July 22, 1966), and the
Diners Club (bulletin of May 1, 1966). By sampling pages, he arrived at the following totals: American Express-2,827; Carte Blanche-2,422; Diners Club-2,817; Total8,066. All three bulletins are supposed to be confidential, presumably because they list
the names of people whose cards are being cancelled for non-payment of bills. As
soon as those indicated as stolen were counted, the bulletins were destroyed by me.
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clause printed in equally obscure type: "5. Retention of this card or
use thereof constitutes acceptance of all the terms and conditions
hereof." Of course, one who read, understood and remembered what
was on the back of the card could minimize any liability under this
system by sending notice to the issuer. One suspects that not all
credit card holders, or even most of them, would read, understand
and remember. Has a holder who fails in any of these respects committed a breach of contract?
B.

The Legal Response: What Has Happened
Before the Legislaturesand the Courts
The response of the legal system to the various patterns of issuing
credit cards has been inconsistent, what with legal agencies making
different judgments as to the proper mix of substantive contract and
legal system policies to pursue. While the situation may look chaotic
from the offices of the general counsels of major credit card issuers,
it is a fine one for purposes of this article. First we will look at some
legal history that will help explain both modern legal results and
business practices. Then we will turn to the three major cases and
the New York statute and appraise them in terms of substantive and
system policies.
The first three relevant cases involved department store "credit
coins" which were misused. There were no holder-is-liable-untilnotice clauses on these credit cards, but the approaches taken by the
courts set the pattern for later cases where such clauses appeared.
Wannamaker v. Megary52 and Lit Brothers v. Haines5 3 reached con-

flicting results in situations where the credit coin had been stolen. In
Wannamaker, a Pennsylvania court said that the holder had made
the misuse of the credit identification symbol possible by losing it and
the store was without notice of the misuse. Thus the holder had to
take the loss. In Lit, the loss was placed on the issuer by a New Jersey
court since there was no contract to assume such liability. Jones
Store Co. v. Kelly-4 concerned a dispute about whether or not the
holder had entrusted his credit coin to a housekeeper who had made
unauthorized purchases. A Missouri court said that had the coin been
stolen, there would be no liability, but if the holder entrusted the
coin to another, the holder would be liable for unauthorized purchases.
The oil companies did not move to the holder-is-liable-until-notice
system until sometime after World War II, but the three decisions
52. 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (C.P. Phil. 1915).
53. 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 At. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
54. 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (1931).
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concerning their credit cards before then also reflect the search for a
sensible basis for dealing with this defect in a useful business innovation. In Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick,55 the holder left his card in the
glove compartment of his car, and his car was stolen on August 27,
1933. The holder did not give Gulf notice until mid-October, according to his testimony, or mid-November, according to Gulf. The thief
used the card during this period. A Pennsylvania court said that there
was a constructive contract, based not on assent but on "reason and
justice," that the card would "be used or honored properly and
with due care." The holder had failed to use it with care and had
failed to give notice "so the plaintiff would then have been enabled
to have invalidated his courtesy card in all of its respective service
56
stations .... ." A Texas court in MagnoliaPetroleum Co. v. McMillan,
placed its decision that the holder was responsible for the misuse
of the card by agents to whom he had entrusted it, squarely on
language printed on the back of the card. The fine print imposed a
much harsher liability than is common today, asserting that the holder
was responsible for "all purchases made by use of this card, prior to
its surrender to the issuing company, whether or not such purchases
are made by the named holder .... ." However, the opinion is weakened slightly when it departs from its "a contract is a contract is a
contract" approach to observe that the holder had never given the,
issuer notice that the agents lacked authority to use the card. The
last case in our historical recapitulation is Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co.,57 decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. In
this case the credit card contained language very similar to that found
on the Magnolia card. Here Gulfs dealers were so grossly careless
(and some even seemed to be knowing parties to the fraudulent misuse
of the card) that it is surprising that Gulf decided to sue and prompt
an adverse precedent. The holder had written on the cards "Good
for Truck Only." The thief, an employee of a Gulf dealer, used it for
purchases for his car in a "90 day orgy of buying from Gulf dealers
in Mississippi towns." In the court's words:
Some of the dealers knew the forger and he had lived in several of the
towns where purchases were made. Tires were sold for a passenger automobile and in some cases of a different size than was required by the
vehicle the forger was driving. One dealer sold him two radios, one for
his car and the other for his house, which were charged as tires and
gasoline and the house radio was never delivered. Charges were made for
20 gallons of gasoline when the capacity of the car the forger was driving
was only 15 gallons. In several instances cash was delivered upon false
55. 24 Pa. D. &C. 147 (C.P. Lancaster 1935).
56. 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
57. 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945).
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invoices made out for merchandise. Most of the invoices had a fictitious
license number written in by the dealer which was different from the
license number upon the automobile driven by the imposter.58

The court refused to follow the Magnolia decision and the language
printed on the card in the face of the conduct of Gulf's dealers and
held that the holder was not liable.
Thus we see just about the whole catalogue of common law
approaches to a new problem: Some courts looked for what could be
labelled fault, another for a real contractual assumption of risk, another
sought a fair allocation of risk in light of business practices by way of
a "constructive contract," and still another treated fine print as if a
contract had been made-and then qualified its abstract approach to
square the case with its feeling about justice. A general counsel of an
issuer of credit cards could not be sure where he stood in light of all
this precedent. Probably this line of cases was one of the factors that
prompted the switch to the now almost standard holder-is-liable-untilnotice system; it could be defended as fair, and it squared with the
approach taken in Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick.5 9
The holder-is-liable-until-notice system has been tested in three
significant cases and is affected by a statute passed in New York
that applies to cases arising after January 1, 1962. In Union Oil Co.
v. Lull,60 fifty-five unauthorized purchases, amounting to 1,454.25
dollars, were made in a month by a person who had stolen the card.
The following appeared on the back of the card: "customer . . .
guarantees payment . . . guarantee to continue until card is surrendered or written notice is received by the company that it is lost
or stolen." 61 Union Oil sued, but the jury found for the defendant
card holder. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Oregon, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The court
observed that the defendant had not raised the argument that he was
unaware of the conditions printed on the back of the credit card and so
he was bound by them. It noted that juries could pass on whether
or not "the terms of the contract were put in deceptive form which
would mislead a reasonable person, and that the defendant was so
misled ....
" 62 Unfortunately a mistake in trial strategy dropped this
issue from the case. However, the court found that the defendant
was "essentially a gratuitous indemnitor." 3 It then observed that in
"a variety of business transactions out of which the liability of the
58. Id. at 365, 186 S.W.2d at 792-93.

59. Supra note 55.
60. 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
61. Id. at 416, 349 P.2d at 245.

62. Id. at 420, 349 P.2d at 247.
63. Id. at 426, 349 P.2d at 249.
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surety, guarantor or indemnitor could arise, the courts have imposed
upon the indemnitee a duty to act in such a way as to protect the
indemnitor to the extent that it was reasonable to do so under the
circumstances."6 From this premise, the court reasoned that the
plaintiff oil company must use "due care... to ascertain the authority
of the customer who presents the card." 65 It noted that the "imposter
was driving an automobile bearing an Idaho license plate; the credit
card showed that Mr. Lull was a resident of Halfway, Oregon ....
It would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that this fact should
have prompted the service station attendants to make inquiry concerning the customer's identity."66 The court held that due care was a
jury question and that the burden of proof was on the oil company.
Moreover, it also held that the oil company had to show that "the
goods for which charges are made were in fact delivered to the customer using the credit card."6 7 Perhaps it was thinking of the Gulf
dealers in the Williams RoofingO case.
On the other hand, in Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein,69 an oil company
won a clear-cut victory in the lower New York courts. There the
court distinguished the Union Oil case because it involved a credit
card which stated that the holder "guaranteed" payment of all charges
until notice was given while the Texaco card stated that the holder
"assumes full responsibility for all purchases made hereunder by
anyone . .. prior ... to giving the Company notice in writing that
the card has been lost or stolen." At the time Mr. Goldstein applied
for his card, there was no mention of the liability-until-notice requirement on the application form issued by Texaco, and the clause quoted
was buried in the middle of a paragraph printed in five or five and onehalf point type. Goldstein raised the fine-print-on-the-back point, but
the court brushed it aside and said that the application was only an
invitation to do business and the credit card was an offer. 0 Thus,
when Goldstein used the card, he accepted that offer on its terms.
The court seemed to assume without discussion that Goldstein had a
duty to read, understand, and remember his obligation to give notice.
64. Id. at 428, 349 P.2d at 250.
65. Id. at 433, 349 P.2d at 252.
66. Id. at 435, 349 P.2d at 253-54.
67. Id. at 437, 349 P.2d at 254.
68. Supra note 57.
69. 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1962), aff'd 39 Misc. 2d
552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
70. Id. at 754, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 54. This reasoning might startle the members of a
first year contracts class that had worked its way through offer and acceptance. Counteroffers to be accepted by silence are close to a form of deception. The situation fits even
more poorly into an offer and acceptance model when the issuer sends out cards to people
who have not applied for them and, in fine print, says that retention or use of the card
constitutes acceptance.
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Once the court had side-stepped the nasty issue about Texaco's tiny

type, it got down to business and candidly explained why Mr. Goldstein should be treated as if he had made a contract:
The agreements expressed in the provisions of the credit card in the case
at bar, are not unreasonable. The plaintiff assumes the risk of all loss after
it receives notice of the loss or theft of the credit card; the defendant assumes
the risk of loss prior to such notice.
With the increasing use of the credit card and its growing importance
to the economy, the imposition of a high duty of diligence upon the major
oil companies in general, most of whom use the same or similar systems of
credit card transactions would result in an impairment of an important
segment of our economic structure. We must take into consideration that
for the most part, the dealers to whom the cards are presented are independent contractors engaged in private enterprise. The plaintiff undertakes
to honor credit card purchases by persons presenting them to the individual
dealers for credit. In each such transaction however, the plaintiff is in no
way involved; it had previously agreed to purchase from the dealer, such
charges at par and the plaintiff has no control of either the dealer or the
purchaser using the card,7 1 until the credit charge invoice actually reaches
the company for payment to the dealer on presentation by him. Accordingly,
the negligence of the card holder becomes most important. The intent of
the parties is that in the event of the issuee's or obligor's loss of his card, or
it having been stolen, that he be required to treat his credit card with at
least the same importance, or perhaps greater importance than he would with
his currency. Assuming the defendant were to have lost some currency, he
alone bears the risk of loss, and his loss is fixed by the amount of currency
he lost. Should he, however, lose his credit card, the amount of loss would
not be fixed, and the risk of loss is not only borne by him, but also by the
Company when he actually complies with the conditions of the issuance of
the card to him. This is a risk the company is apparently willing to assume,
and the only requirement by the company is that the card bolder exercise a
proper degree of care in the handling of his card. Unless actual notice of
loss is given to the company, it can have no way of knowing of such loss,
and to require some thirty thousand dealers to suspect the loss of any
particular credit card and use diligence against its abuse, is not within the
requirements of plaintiff as the issuer of the credit card. Unlike credit
cards used in the restaurant and hotel fields, where personal use to the
issuee is usually restricted, any holder of the credit card can use the
same ....

72

Obviously, the court is most candid about assuming the role of a
regulatory agency.
The last case decided was the Diners Club, Inc. v. Whited,73 which
71. Apparently, the judge did not know about the control petroleum companies

exercise over their dealers or the list system described in the text accompanying pages
1108-13 infra.
72. Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, supra note 69 at 754-55, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 55.

73. Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964. Apparently the case is
unreported. My description of it is based on the comments in 43 N.C.L. Rvv. 416
(1965); 67 W. VA. L. Rxv. 145 (1965). The case was mentioned in N.Y. Times, Aug.

7, 1964, p. 31, col. 6. Apparently, the two reviews sent for the unpublished opinion.
I applaud such industry.
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appeared in 1964. The Diners' Club sued a television director for
1,622.29 dollars charged on his stolen card before he gave Diners
Club notice that his card had been stolen. The back of the credit
card had a clause reading, "If this credit card is lost or stolen, original
holder is liable and responsible for all purchases charged through use
of this card until . . . [he gives] written notice of its loss or theft." 74
The trial court found for The Diners Club because of the language of
the contract. The California Appellate Department reversed and
found for the holder. It said that the issuer owed the holder a duty
of care to see that "irregular charges . .. [were] not unnecessarily incurred,"75 and had the burden of proving that it had been exercised.
That court further found a lack of proof of damages since under the
contract between Diners Club and the various restaurants and other
establishments that had accepted the card, Diners Club only had to
pay for "valid charges" and charges made by a thief were not valid
ones. The case is very similar to Union Oil Co. v. Lull76 but the court
here indicated that the result did not turn on the language of guaranty
or on an assignment theory but was to be the rule governing all credit
card cases.
Finally, we have the New York statute that was introduced about
a year after the Lull case and went into effect in 1962 after the facts
in Goldstein had taken place. It says that:
A provision to impose liability on an obligor for ihe purchase or lease of
property or services by use of a credit card after its loss or theft is effective
only if it is conspicuously written or printed in a size at least equal to eight
point type either on the card, or on a writing accompanying the card when
issued or on the obligor's application for the card, and then only until
written notice of the loss or theft is given to the issuer. Such a provision
either in a credit card issued prior to the effective date of this article, or in
a writing accompanying such a card when issued, or in the obligor's application for such a card is effective, on or after the effective date of this article,
only if the issuer mails to the obligor, properly addressed, written notice of
the provision conspicuously written or printed in a size at least equal to
77
eight point bold type.

For purposes of interpreting the statute, it will be noted that the text
of this article is set in eleven point type and the footnotes in eight point
type. The New York Legislative Committee on Commerce and Economic Development-explained the statute as follows: "It would protect
holders of credit cards against the unknowing assumption of liability
for purchases, etc., by use of a credit card after its loss or theft ...
[by making] ineffective the fine print provisions found on the backs
74.
75.
76.
77.

Comment, '43 N.C.L. REv. 416, 417 (1965).
Id. at 418.
Supra note 60.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 512.
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of many credit cards by which the issuers of cards attempt to impose
liability on holders . . . provisions of which the holder is not made

aware." 78 "The Committee believes that the bill if enacted will protect
both the consumer and issuers of credit cards." 79

C. The Legal Response in Terms of Substantive and System Policies
We can highlight the kinds of value choices being made in these
opinions and in the statute by considering them in view of the
substantive contract and legal system policies which I have suggested.
Let us start with the market oriented substantive policies.
1. Substantive ContractPolicies.-Transactionalpolicy has not been
emphasized. None of the opinions, with the possible exception of
the Williams Roofing8 case, turn on the likely actual expectations of
the parties, and for good reason. At the time all of these opinions and
the statute were written the issuers of credit cards used systems with
the effect, if not the purpose, of hiding the liability-until-notice requirement from the prospective holder of their cards. The applications
made no mention that there might be dangers in the convenience of
having a credit card; the cards contained clauses printed on the back
in unbelievably hard-to-read type. One could not say that officials of
the oil companies or other firms issuing credit cards were misled by
the holder's retention or use of a card and really believed that he
accepted their system. Even under this lesser degree of the objective
theory of contracts, the companies would have no case as long as the
legal system focused on likely or probable expectations involved in
any particular situation. Only in the Lull"' case did the court notice
this problem, but there the holder of the card had failed to raise the
point at trial. The Goldstein opinion slides off this point without
ever resolving it in the judge's eagerness to act as a regulatory agency.
Apparently, in light of the needs of a mass marketing system the
reasonable expectations of an individual have not counted for much.
The New York statute stands at the borders of transactional and
market functioning policies. It calls for the liability-until-notice clause
to be "conspicuously written." It calls for eight point type on the
card, on a writing accompanying the card or on the application. The
New York courts could interpret this to mean that they should ask
78. N.Y. STATE LEcISLATrE ANNUAL 59 (1961).
79. Ibid.
80. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., supra note 57. It is possible to read this
case as resting on an imposed obligation of due care quite apart from the expectations
of either party to the credit card arrangement; it is possible that the parties bad no
expectations about such a flagrant situation since they bad not thought about it at all.
81. Union Oil Co. v. Lull, supra note 60.
82. Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, supranote 69.
83. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAws § 512.
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whether or not in a particular case the warning about the notice
requirement was sufficiently conspicuous so that a reasonable man
would have noticed it. Such a question could be taken as indicating
the likely actual expectations of both the holder and the issuer, and
thus as reflecting implementation of transactional values. Of course,
the answers to this question will not show whether or not a reasonable
man, however defined, should have understood a particular clause
even if he discovered it. On the other hand, the New York courts
could view the statute as calling only for a determination that eight
point type was used. This reading would equate "conspicuous" with
a particular type-size and change the question before the court so that
it no longer would be likely to tap the actual expectations of the
parties. Now it would be a market functioning rule. Holders would
have to protect themselves by reading and understanding the eight
point type. Issuers would be helped in their need to standardize
credit transactions and avoid the details of particular cases. If an
issuer used eight point type on the back of his card (and probably
if it did not adopt a card design in which even eight point type was
hard to discover so that a court would be pushed to stress the term
"conspicuous"), it could forget about problems of legal enforceability
of its liable-until-notice clauses.
The Magnoia?4 and Goldstein8 cases represent much the same
market functioning approach without even the bow to the holder's
expectations that may flow from the statute's demand for eight point
type. Both cases implicitly apply a flat duty to read and understand
rule even though, at least in Goldstein, it seems unlikely that the
statement on the back of the card afforded warning to any but the
super-cautious. The Goldstein opinion rests squarely on the need for
handling masses of credit transactions in routine ways from the pump
to the computer. It views the allocation as fair to the holder and as
based on the need for notice to trigger telling service stations not to
honor the lost or stolen card. Viewed realistically, the Goldstein and86
Magnolia opinions are very similar to Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick
where the court talked of a constructive contract based not on assent
but on "reason and justice."87 Constructive contracts are not an innovation, nor are they necessarily bad; yet candor as in the Gulf case
helps prompt an appraisal of the reasons for treating people as if they
made a bargain when they are not likely to know that they did.
One also can find traces of non-market social planning rules in the
legal response to credit cards. The New York statute requires issuers
84.
85.
86.
87.

Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, supra note 56.
Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, supra note 69.
Supra note 55.
Id. at 150.
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to take the loss caused by misuse once they are given notice; the kinds
of terms found on the cards in the Magnolia8 and Williams Roofing8
cases are no longer legally enforceable in New York. Moreover, the
provision still used in the Airline Travel Card that says that the holder
is responsible for thirty days after he gives notice also is legally unenforceable in New York. The legislature of that state has removed
this question from the control of the large organizations that issue
cards and has made its own allocation based on its view of fairness.
Union Oil Co. v. Lull90 also may represent social planning about the
proper allocation of the risk of loss or theft, but social planning that
arrives at a different conclusion. That case imposes a burden on the
oil company to show that in each transaction involving misuse of the
card its station attendants used care in checking the authority of the
one presenting the card and that goods and services as indicated on the
invoice were actually furnished. It has been suggested that practically
these are impossible burdens to carry since station attendants cannot
possibly remember a particular transaction and do not have sufficiently
standardized routines to show the usual practice as a basis for inferring
that it was followed in a given case. 91 If this is true, the Lull case
actually is a flat rule of social planning that the issuers must take
all losses caused by the misuse of credit cards. Certainly the issuers
can best spread these losses over all transactions (and thus, perhaps,
raise the price of gasoline, motel rooms and other items to those who
do not lose their credit cards), and such a rule may be the proper
reward for an industry that has managed to hide the liability-untilnotice practice in the interstices of the many details on the backs of
credit cards. Whatever the actual goals of the Oregon court, the
argument on the impact of 'these burdens of proof is at least plausible.
Also on the non-market side we have a legal response on the border
between a flat rule and a case-by-case approach. In Gulf Refining Co.
v. Williams Roofing Co.,92 the court refused to enforce a clause on
the back of the card that said the holder was liable for all purchases
until the card was returned. There the Company's dealers had participated in the misuse of the card and helped the theft along. The
oil company had not agreed to assume liability for the acts of its
dealers, and, under classical agency law, many probably were "independent contractors" rather than agents so that Gulf would not be
88. Magnolia Petroleum Co.v. McMillan, supra note 56.
89. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., supra note 57.
90. Supra note 60.
91. 109 U. PA. L. REv. 266, 268 (1960). "It would be highly improbable that a
service station attendant would be able to recall his actions in regard to any particular
transaction, whether or not due care was in fact exercised; and the costs of locating the
proper witnesses and taking depositions would exceed the amount in controversy."
92. Supra note 57.
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responsible for their misdeeds. Nonetheless, the Arkansas court was
unwilling to impose this liability on the holder. On one hand, this
could be viewed as a rule requiring the oil company to be responsible
for its dealers' misconduct concerning credit cards; on the other, the
decision reflects a case-by-case balance of whether the issuer or the
holder should suffer the loss caused by the thief.
The Lull case may involve elements of relief-of-hardship policy if
one concludes that its burdens of proof do not impose absolute
liability on the company. The Supreme Court of Oregon stressed
that the issues of due care on the part of the holder and the service
station attendants are issues for the jury. The court may be counting
on the jury to provide the case-by-case relief to the needy called for
by this policy. As usual, one cannot be sure that relief-of-hardship is
the courts' goal. This policy is seldom discussed openly since it runs
counter to the market economics theories most dominant in contracts
doctrine. And, of course, the Oregon court could be moving only
to a fault test to be supervised strictly by the judiciary.
2. Legal System Policies.-A number of legal system values are
involved in this duty-to-read area. We must consider first the possible
pressure on dockets. Then there are problems of discovering the
truth as we stray from honoring the credit card as written. Next we
must look at efficiency in light of the ability of the legal system to
get inputs of information about problems and likely consequences of
solutions and to get feedback on the consequences of its law makingi.e., how well has it done in dealing with the lost or stolen credit card.
Finally, there is the value of democratic control. What legal agency
should decide whether to favor individual expectations, the needs of
large organizations or impose obligations of care? How should it
make its decision?
a. Pressure on the Dockets.-At the outset we can dismiss any
burden on the system in terms of unmanageable loads caused by the
approaches taken. There have been few reported cases, and there
is good reason to think that there are not many unreported actions at
the trial level. Other-than-legal sanctions probably deter issuers from
using their rights against holders in many instances. Litigation would
not pay unless the amount of the bills run up by the one who was
using the card without authority was substantial. Lawyers and litigation are not free, and there are costs such as the time of officials of
the oil company who must attend a trial rather than work at their
desks. Moreover, an issuer who sues a holder for charges made on a
stolen card is doing little to promote or retain the good will of that
individual. One seldom sues his customers if repeated business is
important. In fact, one can suspect that some of the customers sued
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might be those that the company thinks are not telling the truth when
they disclaim certain bills and say their cards have been stolen. 3 To
borrow the term of my colleague, Professor Klein, the liability-untilnotice rule may be a "surrogate issue"9 for the difficult-to-prove fraud
claim of an issuer against its holder.95 Of course, this surrogate technique will work better if holders do not know of their right to cut
off liability by giving notice; the issuer can then decide whether or not
to use its rights based on its assessment of the honesty of its holder
as well as other considerations such as the amounts involved, the
importance of the particular holder to the issuer, and the likely adverse
impact of suits against holders on those thinking of applying for credit
cards. The more the courts adopt relatively flat rules such as a strict
duty to read or that a clause is binding if it is in eight point type, the
more they will support such a surrogate issue system and avoid
difficult problems of determining the facts in particular cases. Magnolia and Goldstein do this; Lull opens up difficult factual issues; and
one cannot be sure of the approach that may be taken under the
New York statute.
b. Discovering the Truth.-Two approaches avoid most questions
of accuracy of fact-finding. There is little problem if a liability-untilnotice system is enforced whether or not the holder knew or should
have known of it. The only issues would be whether or not the holder
was a holder of the card, when he gave notice, and when the charges
93. The possibility is suggested by the following news story: "Some unsavory Pittsburgh gamblers have come up with a new idea on how to painlessly pay off the bookie
for those losses on the ponies last summer. Give him a couple of credit cards, let him
run up bills equal to the debt, then report the cards as lost or stolen .... Generally, a
charge plate owner is liable for all purchases on his plate, at least until he reports it
missing. In practice, however, most stores don't press claims against a customer whose
plate was lost or stolen. For most purchases, most stores do not ask the purchaser for
further identification. They say they don't because of the time involved and because
they figure most cheats generally would be able to produce a false driver's license, too."
Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1965, p. 1, col. 6.
94. "What cannot be determined directly may, however, be determinable indirectly.
It may be possible to pose some other question that is answerable and verifiable and
that, once answered, will permit an inference as to the proper answer to the basic
question. In other words, we may be able to find some question or issue, or a group
of questions or issues, that is a good surrogate for the ultimate question." Klein, The
Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure
Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. Rxv. 1099, 1103 (1966).
95. Professor Fuller has suggested that large businesses will often use a surrogate
issue technique to reserve for themselves power to decide the good faith of another's
claim. "The practice actually followed in the settlement of claims by companies which
employ a standard form for transacting business is often much more liberal than might
be inferred from the terms of the contract they ask their customers to sign . . . . The
companies, in other words, prefer to reserve to themselves a determination of the
question of good faith instead of having that issue submitted to a jury; they seek a
contractual margin of safety within which they can exercise their own discretion free
from the threat of litigation." FuLLER, BASIC CoNcrAc LAw 213-14 (1947).
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were made. These seem exceedingly straight-forward questions. Almost as easy, from this viewpoint, is the opposite rule. It is hard to
think of many questions of fact if the issuer is liable for all charges
made with a lost or stolen card. Of course, there would have to be
proof that the card was lost and that the charges in question were not
made by the holder. In most instances, this probably would not be
difficult-signatures could be compared and one could check to be
sure that the holder had not used the card after he claimed to have
lost it. However, standards calling for balancing the amount of
care exercised by holder and issuer, for enforcing liability-until-notice
clauses if "conspicuous," or for seeking the best balance of the expectations and reliance of the parties call for difficult factual determinations.
For example, due care might turn on what a station attendant did in a
particular transaction. Can he remember any one car, driver and
business procedure after some time has elapsed? Can he sufficiently
show a regular pattern of conduct to allow proof of routine as a substitute for knowledge of the actual case? Clearly, the substantive
goal that poses questions of this order, with their inherent uncertainty
that tends to lead to settlement rather than judicial solutions, must
be deemed important enough to warrant the effort and the difficulties
involved in answering the questions and the risk of believing the
wrong person. Written documents and signatures make things easy
and ease of administration is not the least of the values in any system, including the legal.
c. Efficacy and Efficiency: Rule Making and the Access to Data.Another important legal system policy is that a legal agency should
hesitate before it attempts a task it is unlikely to do very well. For
example, courts may be thought to lack inputs needed to regulate
well. They cannot go out and seek problems to solve but must make
their mark on society through the accident of the demands made
upon them. Even when they get a problem they may lack information about its precise nature or the likely consequences of the possible
solutions open to them. They may also lack feedback, that is, information about the intended and unintended consequences of past solutions enabling them to learn through a trial and error process. Legislatures and administrative agencies often have the same difficulties;
theoretically they can do much better on data gathering, but practically they frequently are no better off than courts. In this section, I
will attempt to assess the impact of the legal system, if any, on the
practices of those who issue and accept credit cards and those who
hold them. This calls for data on these practices and on the role
played by the legal response to the lost or stolen card. Then the
impact will be evaluated in terms of the legal system's difficulties
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with inputs and feedback. At various times and places the legal system has attempted to promote warning and knowledge, to impose a
duty of due care on both holder and issuer, to impose liability without
fault or choice on issuers and to impose that same kind of liability
on holders. To what extent has it achieved these goals? To what
extent are its failures caused by shooting in the dark?
(1) Market Functioning and Transactional Goals of Warning and
Knowledge about the Liability-Until-Notice System.-The New York
statute was aimed, in part, at giving the credit card holder more
warning of the liability-until-notice system. To be effective in New
York such clauses now must be "conspicuously written or printed in a
size at least equal to eight point type... . -96 Moreover, in Union Oil
Co. v. Lull,97 the Supreme Court of Oregon indicated that juries could
pass on whether or not "the terms of the contract were put in deceptive form which would mislead a reasonable person, and that defend" To what extent did this part market-functionant was so misled ....
ing, part transactional-legal response prompt greater warning of the
liability-until-notice system to holders of credit cards in 1966 than
existed in the early 1960's and late 1950's?
First, what changes in warning, if any, have occurred from the time
of the statute and the case to the present? I obtained applications and
credit cards in the summer of 1963; also I have the materials gathered
in late 1959 for a note in the Notre Dame Lawyer.98 ' In the summer
of 1966, once again I collected applications and credit cards for comparison. Just by looking at these applications and cards one can make
many intuitive judgments about the amount of warning of the liabilityuntil-notice system given by the various issuers before 1963 and ii
1966. However, it seems appropriate to be more systematic. 9 What
96. N.Y. GENs. Bus.
97. Supra note 60.

LAw

§ 512.

98. See Note, 35 NoTRE DAvmE LAw. 225 (1960). I want to thank Professor Edward J. Murphy for his help in obtaining this material.
99. The description of the advertising, application blanks, credit cards and literature
used by various companies is based partly on my impressions but primarily on the
ratings given all of this material by M~r. Allan Blank, a third year law student and an
editor of the Wisconsin Law Review. Ideally, one would use several raters more representative of credit card holders, but this was not feasible because it took over seven
hours to rate all of the material. A rough check of the reliability of Mr. Blank's ratings
was made by having my wife, Jacqueline Macaulay, rate the 1963 materials, and Professor William Whitford, a contracts teacher at the University of Wisconsin Law School,
rate the 1966 materials. These ratings were compared with Mr. Blank's, and while
the absolute scores given particular items varied a good deal from rater to rater, the
raters agreed, for example, that the liability-until-notice clause on one of the 1966
Texaco cards plus the literature that is sent with it, is the most visible and the clause on
the Phillips 66 c6rd is the least visible, etc. Thus, I have some confidence in Mr.
Blank's ordering of these materials in terms of their visibility and understanding. It
should be pointed out, however, that all three raters are more accustomed to working
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with written documents than the average holder of credit cards-a factor which may
bias all ratings in some consistent way which cannot be detected. My guess is that
it made the judgments favor the issuers by finding items more visible and more understandable.
How did they rate the materials? Each item was ranked on all of the factors listed
in the text as components of visibility by sorting all of the items under scale numbers
that ran from one (e.g., smallest type, least contrast between type and background,
etc.) to seven (e.g., largest type, most contrast, etc.). Each item was ranked for understandability by rating it on a six-place scale in terms of how clearly the idea was stated.
Points were then given for sequence. The result was a more systematic measure of
visibility and understandability, and it was made by people who had no hypothesis to
"prove" since Mr. Blank was working for me on an unrelated project and Professor
Whitford and Mrs. Macaulay did not know my conclusions about specific items.
The ranks (first place is the most visible or the most clear) with tied positions
averaged are as follows:
1963
risibility
Understandability
Credit cards
Applications
Credit cards
Applications
I Sinclair
I Shell
4 Deep Rock
1.5 Avis
2 Texaco
4 Enco
1.5 Texaco
2 Cities Service
3 Cities Service
3 Avis
3 Conoco
4 Phillips
4 Mobil
4 Pure
4.5 Standard
4 Phillips
5 Shell
5.5 Conoco
4 Shell
4.5 Cities Service
6.5 Deep Rock
4 Sinclair
11 Clark
5.5 Texaco
6.5 Pure
7.5 Enco
4 Texaco
11 DX
8.5 Standard*
7.5 Standard
8 Skelly
11 Enco
8.5 Enco
9 Hertz
9 Mobil
11 Gulf
10.5 Skelly
10 Standard
11 Mobil
13 Clark
10.5 Phillips
11 Cities Service
11 Phillips
13 DX
13 Gulf
11 Pure
13 Mobil
11 Shell
13 Pure
11 Sinclair
13 Sinclair
11 Skelly
13 Skelly
11 Hertz
1966
Understandability
Visibility
Credit cards
Applications
Credit cards
Applications
1 Texaco
1 Avis
1 Citgo
1 Texaco
3.5 Shell
2 Shell
2 Standard 63+
2 Avis
3.5 Sinclair
4 Standard 66
10 Citgo
4 Enco
3.5 Mobil
4 Skelly
4 Hertz
10 Clark
3.5 Avis
4 Gulf
4 Skelly
10 Conoco
6 Gulf
7 Citgo
11.5 Clark
10 DX
7.5 Pure
7 Phillips
11.5 Conoco
10 Deep Rock
7.5 Clark
7 Texaco
11.5 DX
10 Enco
9.5 Hertz
10 Mobil
11.5 Deep Rock
10 Gulf
9.5 Conoco
11 Conoco
11.5 Enco
10 Mobil
11 Citgo
12 Standard
11.5 Mobil
10 Phillips
13.5 Skelly
13.5 Pure
11.5 Phillips
10 Pure
13.5 Enco
13.5 Hertz
11.5 Pure
10 Shell
13.5 Deep Rock
15.5 Clark
11.5 Shell
10 Sinclair
13.5 DX
15.5 DX
11.5 Sinclair
10 Skelly
17 Standard
15.5 Deep Rock
11.5 Texaco
10 Standard
63+*
15.5 Sinclair
11.5 Avis
10 Hertz
66*
18 Gulf
17 Phillips
* Standard had three cards that were rated. One was used from 1961 to 1963, another
from 1963 to 1966 (63+), and the last one was issued in 1966.
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kind of printed information is likely to give warning; what kind is
likely to fail? The New York statute mentions eight point type as a
minimum, but it seems obvious that a good deal more is involved. I
would argue that the relevant bit of information must be visible so
that attention is drawn to it; it must be understandable,and things are
more understandable when they are spelled out explicitly in simple
and precise language; and the information should come nearer the
beginning of a transaction than the end so that it can be considered
when deciding whether or not to enter a bargain rather than after
one has ceased thinking about the matter.
All of the available 1963 and 1966 applications, cards, and literature have been rated on a series of scales designed to reflect those
things that make up visibility, understandability and sequence. What
is involved in visibility? I would expect people to be able easily to
read a clause printed in large, bold type in contrasting color where
there was little distraction from other things such as trade marks
printed in color, where the clause was not buried in a mass of type,
where there was adequate spacing between letters and lines and
where there was no distortion caused by embossing a name across
the matter to be read. I would expect a clause to be progressively
harder to read as we subtracted any of these items. Assuming one
can find the particular clause without undue effort, can he be
expected to understand it? This is a question of the effort a holder
must exert to read or imply any relevant bit of information out of
what the issuer printed on his applications, cards or literature. Things
can be remotely possible inferences, clearly implied, or clearly,
precisely and simply stated. What ideas should a holder get out of a
These tables can be read as follows: take Mobil, for example. In 1963, its application was in a tie for most invisible because it said nothing about the risk of loss, and
its card was a little better than in the middle in terms of visibility. Since the application was silent, it was not at all understandable, and the card was less understandable
than most. In 1966, Mobirs clause on its application was near the middle in terms of
visibility, but its card was near the top in this regard. (The clause is now printed in
red type). Its application was tied for the bottom in terms of understandability, but its
card was no more but no less understandable than most of the others.
I had the others rank the material available at the time when they did the rating.
As a result, the ratings for some issuers, such as the three travel and entertainment
cards, were incomplete since I had only some of their material then. My judgments
on these issuers reported in the text were made by comparing their materials with
others and seeing where what I thought were comparable items ranked. Some items
such as the Diners Club flyer reproduced in the text and the American Express literature on its $100-deductible system were ranked by Mr. Blank and Professor Whitford,
and so my judgments about them have a sounder basis.
I wish to thank Professor Burton R. Fisher of the University of Wisconsin Department of Sociology and my wife, Jacqueline R. Macaulay, for their help in setting up
and carrying out these ratings and Professor Whitford and Mr. Blank for their many
hours of judging credit cards and the like.
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I would argue the following are all

(1) If the credit card issued to you is lost or stolen, you may save
a large amount of money by notifying us immediately.
(2) A person who finds your card or gets it from a thief might use
it to make purchases at our stations because our station attendants
often cannot discover that a card does not belong to a person who
presents it to them. [substitute for "our stations" and "station attendants," the phrases "places that accept our cards," and "the people who
write up charge slips" where appropriate.]
(3) You must pay us for the charges made with your card by any
person after it has been lost or stolen until you give us notice that this
has happened. You do not have to pay for purchases made with a
lost or stolen credit card which are made after you have given us
notice.
(4) Make a record of your credit card number and the following
address
. If your card is lost or stolen, tell us and report
your number to this address. 10 0
Finally, there is the question of sequence. A visible and understandable provision can aid a prospective holder if he can read it
before he decides to apply for a card; then he can decide not to apply
if he thinks the risks are too great or he can apply and get insurance
or exercise an extra measure of care in using his card. If the notice
comes later, the holder is already committed to the transaction and
may have learned a pattern of conduct that is careless. Now the notice
must really be jarring to affect his behavior.
Using these standards, to what extent has the warning of the
liability-until-notice system changed from 1963 to 1966? First, let's
look at the earlier materials. The general credit cards are the most
dangerous ones since an unauthorized use can run up large bills so
quickly. Yet there was no warning of a liability until notice on three
different application forms of the Diners Club which were found
100. People can differ about how much a prospective holder of a credit card must
be told about the liability-until-notice system. If someone disagrees with my bits of
information listed in the text, he might get very different results as a rater if he compared
the provisions used by the issuers with a different list. However, the issuers were so
bunched on the understandability rating that I doubt significant differences would appear as long as the alternative list of items included a clear statement that one must
pay for charges until, but not after, he gives notice of loss or theft.
Most issuers leave the first, second and fourth components of a liability-until-notice
clause as listed in the text unstated explicitly; the third is always stated. One major
problem faced by one who has lost his credit card, and who knows about the liabilityuntil-notice system, is finding the address to which to send his notice. The very
cautious make records of such things; a few issuers send their holders a separate piece
of paper to keep as a record of the card number and the address. It seems to me that
if the issuers really want notice, they ought to make it as easy as possible to give it.
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in airports and restaurants in Madison, Wisconsin and Chicago, Illinois
during 1963. The applications appear to be the same as those collected
in 1959. On the other hand, Carte Blanche managed to turn the
notice requirement into an attraction for holding one of its cards in a
series of advertisements that appeared in 1963:
Q. Is there protection against credit card loss?
A. Credit cards are safer than cash. If you lose your card, as
soon as you notify us, you are free from liability. What's more,
our computer is so sensitive to erratic spending that we may
surmise your loss even before you realize it.1 1
Carte Blanche's liability-until-notice requirement is printed on the
back of its 1963 application as the fifth of ten clauses. It was not
given particular emphasis. There was no such provision on the
1959 form.
American Express was distributing several inconsistent versions of
an application form. One picked up in 1963 does not mention the
liability-until-notice requirement. Another states it without emphasis.
A third states this requirement in bold print above the signature line.
A 1959 form states above the signature line that the holder agrees to
"the conditions printed on the reverse side of this application." The
third of five clauses printed in fairly small type says that the "holder
...

will be responsible for the payment of any amounts charged by the

use of the card until such notice is given."
In 1963, the two leading car rental agencies provided a neat contrast. The Hertz application is silent on the loss or theft of a card. Avis
tried harder and printed a warning in bold type above the signature
line and elsewhere explained in bold type what should be done in
case of loss or theft.
Application blanks were obtained from the following oil companies
in 1963: American Oil Company (Standard in the Midwest; Amoco
in the East); Cities Service (now Citgo); Clark; Continental
(Conoco); Sunray DX; Enco (Standard of New Jersey in the Midwest); Gulf; Mobil; Pure; Phillips; Shell; Sinclair; Skelly and Texaco.
The Clark, Sunray DX, Gulf, Mobile, Pure and Skelly applications
said nothing about liability-until-notice. The provisions on the Cities
Service and Shell applications were highly visible; those on the
American, Conoco, Enco and Phillips applications were much less
visible. Yet all of them required real imagination if a reader were to
infer that he was liable until he gave notice. Shell asked for a blank
check: "I desire the convenience of a Shell Credit Card to be issued
101. See, e.g., Wall St. J., July 25, 1963, p. 4, cols." 4-6; id., June 27, 1963, p. 5,
cols. 4-6.
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under your usual terms and conditions upon your approval of this
application." Continental stated the idea for a student of this subject
but probably not for others: ". . . I agree to pay all charges . . . [Emphasis added]" Phillips was less clear, ". . . I agree to pay my account . . ." Enco was slightly misleading: ". . . I agree to pay my
monthly charges . . . [Emphasis added]." 0 2 Only the Texaco form
explicitly mentioned liability-until-notice to applicants for credit cards,
but it did so with some emphasis:
My credit is
established at:

/2.

(List account number
if available)

(Name)

(Address)

(Name)

(Address)

(Name)
(Address)
Terms: Full payment upon receipt of monthly statement. Deferred payment plan
available on purchases of Firestone or B. F. Goodrich tires, tubes, batteries
FORM
and accessories of $30.00 or more, if requested at time of purchase.
It-soM

SS6C
SHTS.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT LIABILITY FOR ALL PURCHASES MADE THROUGH THE CREDIT
CARD, PRIOR TO SURRENDER TO TEXACO INC. OR WRITTEN NOTICE TO TEXACO INC. OF
ITS LOSS, RESTS UPON APPLICANT.
Signature:

FOR COMPANY

INDIVIDUAL APPLICANT

ACCOUNT
Signature of Executive

Title

ALL APPLICATIONS ARE HANDLED PROMPTLY AND IF CREDIT IS
APPROVED, YOUR TEXACO NATIONAL CREDIT CARD(S) SHOULD BE
MAILED TO YOU WITHIN 20 DAYS.
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION-FOLD AND SEAL HERE

Turning from applications to cards, when a holder received his
card before 1963,103 he might or might not be warned that if his card
was lost or stolen, he had to give notice to escape responsibility for
unauthorized purchases. This fact was prominently stated on the back
of the IBM card American Express sent with its credit card in 1963.
On the face of the IBM card the following message appeared: "Important: Should you lose your card report the loss immediately to
American Express. Keep the card with you at all times. Never leave
it in auto glove compartments or your hotel room."u °4 In contrast in
1959, a Diners Club card was the outside front cover of a small booklet
that contained about 125 pages of listings of places where the card
could be used. On the inside of the front cover were nine clauses in
102. And thus not those made by another?
103. In 1963, I'collected credit cards from my colleagues and made copies of them.
As a result, I do not have a complete set since not all companies were represented on
the University of Wisconsin Law Faculty.
104. Almost exactly the same form was used to send a renewal card to me in August
of 1966. The major differences are that the following is printed in red ink across the
top of the card: "This Card Is Your Most Valuable Credential-Guard It Carefully,"
and the terms and conditions are now referred to on the face of the IBM card in red
ink.
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very small type, and the liability-until-notice provision was the fourth.
As for oil company credit cards, all those surveyed used liability-untilnotice clauses but opinions could differ about whether or not a
reasonable man would notice the clauses on some of them. All were
about equally as visible or invisible, depending on the descriptive
term one preferred. For example:

This card confirms the authorization of credit, during the period shown, to the person,
corporation, or firm wihosename is embossed on the reverse side hereof. Such person, cor.
poratien. or firm assumes fil1 responsibility for all purchases made horeunder by any one
th~ough the se of fhis card prior to surrendering it to the Company or to giving the
Company notice in writing that the card has been lostor stolon. Rstention of this card or
use thereof constitutes acceptance of allthe termsand conditions thereof.
This card willbe honored in the United States by dealersseling Texpco Gasolines, for
the following
merchandise and services:
I. Texaco Petroleum Products, Maflak Lubrication Service, end washing and polishing service for passenger cars and truchs.
2. New or retreaded Firestone or B. F. Goodrich passenger car and truckfires.
new tubes batteries, and accessories, plus 'installation charges, If any. also
tire and tube repairs, provided at time of sale the merchandise purchased Is
mounted on or attached to motor vehicle operated by holder of card. Such
items as general repairs or mechanical work of any natureare not authorized.
3. Texaco Petroleum Productsfor aircraft and marine vessels.
It willalso be honored in Canada for credit purchases of similar merchandise and
services, by dealers of Texaco Canada Limited, soiling Texaco Gasollnes.
Amounts due on purchases made by use of this card are payable, without discount
Upon receipt of monthly statement. The Company reserves the right at any time to cancel
or to nulify the authorization of credit hereunder.
Form-S-87 F
TEXACO 3.c.
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Things appear to have improved by 1966, but the advances are not
great in some cases, and things remain the same in others. By and
large, those companies concerned with giving visible and understandable warning at the early stages of the relationship continue to do so
in 1966. All three travel and entertainment cards mention liabilityuntil-notice in their advertising for new holders or on their application
blanks. The literature sent to people who ask for a Diners Club
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application blank now is the most visible and understandable of all.
It looks like this:

don't worry
if your card is

Lost

You enjoy unlimited credit card protection at
absolutely no cost for any unauthorized charges
over $100 in the event of loss or theft of your
Diners Club Card. In addition, your responsibility for any fraudulent charges stops the moment
you notify Diners Club of loss or theft of your
card. Thus if you notify Diners Club before your
card is fraudulently used, you are protected
against all liability.
However, in the unlikely event that you should
ever require additional protection against the
loss or theft of your card, the Beneficial Standard
Life Insurance Company offers Diners Club members a low cost group policy that covers in full
the first $100 of fraudulent charges on a Diners
Club Card. The policy also covers 7 other credit
cards for up to $2,500 for one card or $5,000 for
all cards, with the first $50 of any loss being
deductible.
It's the finest credit card protection insurance
available. The cost? Only $2.40 per year . . .
and the premium may be charged to your Diners
Club account.

It will be noted that the Diners Club, following the lead of American
Express which acted in November of 1965, now has changed the system
so that one who fails to give notice before his card is misused is
liable only up to 100 dollars. Both Diners Club and Carte Blanche
sell insurance covering lost or stolen cards, and these changes have
prompted much of the advertising of the problem. Despite this
improvement in warning, it should also be noted that all accent the
positive in a way that might be misleading. For example, American
Express which acted in November of 1965, now has changed the system
your card is fraudulently used, you are protected against all liability."0 5 The most noticeable case of backsliding is Carte Blanche:
105. The quotation is from material sent to holders of American Express cards in
November of 1965 to announce the new "$100-deductible' system. American Express
has continued to mention the risks of lost cards in its advertisements. The following
appeared, but was not emphasized, in eight advertisements: "If your American Ex-
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it went from an application that spelled out the clause in detail in
1963 to one in 1966 that talked of accepting the terms and conditions
(whatever they might be) that accompanied the card. However,
Carte Blanche did mention lost cards in its 1965 advertising. 06
Hertz and Avis car rental agencies continue to use the same applications today as in 1963-Avis gives very clear warning and Hertz gives
none. There has been some change in the warning given by the oil
companies on their applications. Most of those surveyed in 1963
continue to say nothing about liability-until-notice. Texaco's application form that was introduced in 1963 gives less emphasis to the
provision than its 1961 form did-the type is less bold and it now has
other matter in the same large type competing for attention. Gulf and
Pure both print a statement above the signature line that says that
the applicant agrees to the terms and conditions printed on the card,
without specifying what they are. Shell talks of its "usual terms and
conditions" without telling the applicant what they are or where to
look for them. Pure speaks of agreeing to the "terms and conditions
of use printed on credit card." Citgo and Standard of Indiana both
tell the applicant in small type that he is responsible for all purchases
made through presentation of the card but do not mention lost or
stolen cards.
The credit cards and the material sent with them vary much more
press Card is ever lost or stolen, you don't have to worry about a stranger running up
a big bill in your name. If you call American Express right away, the company assumes all charges. But even if you can't call, you're automatically covered with $100deductible liability protection. It's free." This statement in each advertisement is in
a column of type two inches wide along the left border about seventeen inches from the
top of the page. It is set off by a small headline. The emphasis in the advertisement
is on such catchy slogans as, "Cash is the curse of the traveling class." See N.Y. Times,
Aug. 2, 1966, p. 68; id., July 26, 1966, p. 15; id., July 12, 1966, p. 17; id., June 28,
1966, p. 19; id., June 21, 1966, p. 29; id., June 14, 1966, p. 29; id., June 7, 1966, p. 27;
id., May 31, 1966, p. 23.
106. See Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1965, p,11. Despite this advertising, it should be noted
that Carte Blanche is the only one of the three travel and entertainment cards that does
not limit claims against its holders to $100 for charges made by one without authority
before notice of loss or theft. Notice of the terms and conditions comes on a leaflet enclosed with the card. The leaflet is called "13 Facts You Should Know About Carte
Blanche." Thirteen items are numbered, and then the conditions are set out. The fifth is
the liability-until-notice provision. Some emphasis is given by the words "LOST or
STOLEN" which are capitalized. It is not a very visible warning.
Carte Blanche's most recent advertising campaign makes no mention of the risk of
lost or stolen cards. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 17, 1966, p. 25, cols. 2-8; id., June 13,
1966, p. 31, cols. 2-8; id., June 9, 1966, p. 33, cols. 2-8. Probably, Carte Blanche
has given progressively less notice than its two larger competitors because it alone
still has an unlimited liability-until-notice system rather than limiting its claim to $100
as do its two larger competitors. It would be interesting, but almost impossible, to test
whether or not the greater liability under a Carte Blanche card has had any affect on
its recruiting of new holders.
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in 1966107 than they "did in 1963. The 'three travel and e teftainment
cards mention the liability-until-notice system on the literature accompanying the card. The Hertz card prints its liability-until-notice clause
on the back of the card at the end of one and one-fourth inches of
fairly small but widely spaced type. The card is sent to holders in a
folder that certainly distracts one's attention from terms and conditions-a gentleman is showing an attractive young lady the Mustang he
rented from Hertz. Avis is a model, providing a place to record the
number of the card on a folder, without the distractions of attractive
women and automobiles, that gives both warning and the address to
write if a card is lost or stolen.
The oil companies show great variation. The 1966 Texaco liabilityuntil-notice clause on its card 'and the material sent with it is the most
visible. They have high contrast between the figure and the background, little distraction because of emphasis given to things other
than the terms and conditions, good emphasis because of their position
among all the type, and good emphasis because of type size and
boldness. The Texaco card and the material sent with it looks something like this:
This credit card will be honored by dealers selling Texaco gasoline
in the United States and Canada for purchases of Texaco products
and other merchandise and services that'Texaco has authorized such
dealers to sell on credit when. delivered into -or installed upon
MOTOR VEHICLES, BOATS and AIRCRAFT.
THE PERSON, CORPORATION OR FIRM WHOSE NAME IS EMBOSSED HEREON, BY RETAINING OR USING THIS CARD, AGREES
TO PAY, UPON RECEIPT OF EACH MONTHLY STATEMENT, 'FOR
ALL PURCHASES MADE BY ANYONE USING THIS CARD. THIS
OBLIGATION SHALL END ONLY UPON THE SURRENDER OF THIS
CARD TO TEXACO OR UPON TEXACO'S RECEIPT OF WRITTEN
NOTICE THAT THIS CARD HAS BEEN LOST OR STOLEN.
Texaco reserves the right to cancel or modify this authorizafion of
credit at any time and to demand the surrender of this card.
TEXACO s

107. In 1966, I applied for, or had friends apply for, the bredit 'cards of the three
travel and entertainment issuers, the automobile rental companies, Northwest Orient

Airlines, and all petroleum companies represented in Madison, Wisconsin. I received
cards from all the oil companies, the car rental companies, and Carte Blanche. After
waiting six weeks my colleague on the Wisconsin Law Faculty who applied for the
American Express Card gave up in disgust-he was leaving on a trip to California during
which he had hoped to use the card. My Diners Club card was forwarded to me in
California after I left Madison, too late for use in the ratings described in note 99 supra.
I have some of their materials that I obtained from other colleagues who held their
cards. I made a great tactical error in dealing with Northwest Orient. Their application
reads, "I agree to and accept the terms of the applicable tariff regulations." I wrote
Northwest Orient asking for an explanation of what those regulations might be but they
failed to reply. A judge that enforced this arrangement as a contract would be a true
believer in magic.
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We are pleased to enclose your Texaco National Credit Card.
It is the only Petroleum Credit Card Honored under one sign
in all 50 States - and in Canada,
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
We hope you will start using your card
immediately for credit purchases of Texaco
quality products and services for your car,
boat or airplane. Your Texaco Credit Card
may also be used for purchases of authorized tires, batteries, accessories and Texaco
authorized Motor Tune-up service and, if
desired, on a deferred payment plan. More
details on Texaco's easy payment plan appear on the back.
IMPORTANT:

Texaco employs the widely used cycle
billing system which provides for mailing
statements throughout the month on approximately the same date each month.

Payment is due when statement is received. Your statement will include all purchases and payments received by the billing office up to the date shown on the
statement.

If your Credit Card is lost

or stolen, notify immediately the Texaco
office from which your statements are
issued to avoid credit responsibility for
fraudulent use of your card.

Citgo (Cities Service in 1963), Mobil, Shell and Sinclair also all made

efforts to provide visible and understandable warning on cards and
on literature included with the cards. Phillips 66 held a firm grip on
last place among those I obtained because of its cluttered card with
tiny type buried in the middle of a paragraph and distorted by
embossing. It looks like this:
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The Sunray DX, Deep Rock [Keer-McGee], and Enco cards were not
much better. Deep Rock's clause is not particularly easy to find.
Enco's card features a thick red border and screaming trade marks to
distract the holder. The DX clause is hard to find at the bottom of
the back of the card:
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DX LIFETIME CREDIT CARD
THIS CARDmaybe honored for credit purchasesof gasoline,oil
or anti-freere delivered Into. lubricationor wshing of. tire and
battery service upo, or accessoriesand new Firestone or Good.
year tires and batteries attached to the vehicle or motor boat
occupied by holder of card by authorizedOX dealers. Subject to
the conditions hereon, this card may be honored for credit pr.
chases of the above servicesand like merchandise resularly sold
by authorized dealers of the following corepanies.
SUNRAY
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CREDIT may be withdrawn at any time. Custoaer agrees to sirrendercard on request. By retention of this card, the person or
firm to who it is Issoed agreesto be responsible for all credit
extended on its presentationuntil written notice is receivedby
the Companythat card has been lost or stolen. Accounts are
payableupon presentationof statewent.

American Oil Company's card uses thick type but crowds clauses at
the bottom under a display of trade marks and distorts all of them
by embossing. Conoco buries its clauses in a mass of type although it
is nicely spaced and not too invisibly small.

A court that enforced any of these last five, and perhaps some of
the others, would not be a court concerned with giving the holder a
chance to discover the liability-until-notice system. What is worse,
Standard, Conoco and Phillips 66 also hide clauses that say that the

notice cut-off of liability does not apply if the holder entrusted the
card to another; "If holder originally delivered this card to anyone
voluntarily, holder shall also be liable for purchases made after such
notice."'0 On both the Standard and the Phillips cards sent to me the
embossing of my name and account number further obscured this

clause.
108. As a result of a trip west, I can report that Standard Oil of California also uses
an entrusting clause hidden in a mass of tiny type crowded at the bottom of the back
of its card. In Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Greif, 10 App. Div. 2d 119, 197 N.Y.S.2d 522
(3d Dep't 1960), the court refused to impose liability on a husband who had entrusted
a card to his wife who later separated from him and kept the card. The court commented that Mobil's "contention as to the necessity of the surrender of both cards has
no support in any of the contract provisions and there seems to us no sufficient basis

for inferring such a condition." Id. at 120, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 523. Standard, Conoco and
Phillips seem to have taken the courtes language as an invitation. University professors
who hold Standard credit cards, in an informal survey of my friends, are shocked and
annoyed by this clause. Only the greatest respect for bureaucratic policy could justify
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Several issuers also furnish warning of liability-until-notice on literature sent after the card is issued. For example, all three travel and
entertainment cards mention it in their guide books of places that
accept their credit cards. Shell, in the first part of 1966, sent its credit
card holders a leaflet telling them "Your Shell Credit Card should be
protected with the same care you'd give currency." It also contained
a space to record the credit card number, the address to send notice
of loss and spaces to record other credit card numbers.
Most of the liability-until-notice clauses were about the same when
rated for understandability. All could be more explict and could stress
the risk and the urgency of giving immediate notice, but all could be
worse. The least understandable liability-until-notice clause was
Gulf's, but not by much.
YOUR PASSPORT TO MOTORING PFASURE
upon request.
This credit card isthe propre ofGulf and isto be returned
Acceptance by the party named on the front implies responsibility for all service

must be reported
inwrithereby.Loss
orthft hereof
tio fothsandise obtained
ingimmediately toavoidresponsibility
forunauthorized
use.

B31mSH-AMEPECAN

HOLIDAY
INNS

OFAMERICA

SKMLY

Thiscredit
cardwill
be honored
atGulfstations
and wherever
any ofthese
emblems aredisplayed
inthe United
States,
Canada and Puero RICO.

GULF.7.... GULF OIL CORPORATION

A reader must draw many inferences to extract the necessary informa-

tion from this language. However, it should be noted that it does
co"immediately "
use the word
mon in these clauses.

9 to

connote urgency which isnot com-

enforcing such a lase except in the joy ride case-"Here, take my card, run up bills
and I'll tell the Company that it is stolen." The three oil companies may be trying
to set up another surrogate for having to prove that this happened whenever they are
sure but cannot prove it has. On the other band, taken literally, if a man gave a
card to his wife (Phillips even sends two without a special request) and she lost it,
then even notice to the company would not stop the holder's liability. This bothered
my friends.
109. When I reported to Gulf that my card was lost in order to check whether or
not it issued new numbers, see note 129 infra, it sent the new card with the same
number in a folder that on a perforated section stated: "IMPORTANT: Detach and
retain this card in a safe place. If your travel card is lost or stolen, the Gulf office
from which you are billed should be advised immediately, giving your account number
and'name. A new card will be issued promptly." On another part of the folder, the
following appeared, "It is our policy to provide you two travel cards so that other
members of your family may enjoy the convenience of saying 'charge it.' If at present
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In sum, there has been some improvement in visibility and understandability but there is room for more.
So much for the warning given by the various issuers. What do
people actually know? Is there a general awareness of the liabilityuntil-notice'system, and if there is, what conclusions should be drawn
from this fact? Ideally, to answer these questions, one should survey
a random sample of people who hold different kinds of credit cards
and a random sample who hold none at all. I did not have the
resources to run anything close to such a study, but I tried to get some
idea of the answers by a simple survey of customers coming into
five service stations. Seventy-two people, an average of almost fifteen
a station, were interviewed while an attendant was filling their tank.
Forty-three held oil company credit cards, and twenty-nine did not.
Only two persons refused to answer.
The twenty-nine people who did not hold cards were asked, "Suppose a person loses a credit card. What should he do about it?" All
but one said that he should notify the company. And they all knew
why: "So nobody runs Up bills"; "Pretty darn important-otherwise
somebody could pick it up and start charging on your account";
"Very important-otherwise you can lose money if someone else gets
his hands on it"; "Right away so nobody could charge"; "If it's lost,
it's the first thing I would do"; "Important so that you don't get
billed for extra gas." Because I was afraid I was leading the witness
after the first day's results, I added two questions to the interview.
First, I asked, "Suppose a man didn't know he was supposed to
notify the company that his card was lost or stolen; do you think that
he should be liable for charges made by someone who used his card"?
Nine people thought our hypothetical card holder should be held.
One commented that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." Seven
disagreed, and two had no opinion. Second, I asked, "Suppose a
person doesn't use his card often, say once every two weeks. After
using it on May 1st, he doesn't try to use it until May 15th, at which
time he finds it missing and immediately reports it to the company.
Do you think he should be liable for charges made by a thief or
finder during the period from May 1st to May 15th?" Seven people
who did not have oil company credit cards thought he should be
liable. One commented, "if the card reads you're liable, then you
should be liable." But eight disagreed and four replied that they had
no opinion.
Those forty-three people who held oil company credit cards were
you do not need the extra card, it will be readily available should you lose or damage
the card you're using." Certainly, apart from the word "immediately" on the card,
Gulf is not doing much to impress me with the urgency of giving notice to stop liability
for lost or stolen cards.
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asked a similar set of questions. Only four said they would do nothing
if they lost a credit card, and all the rest said they would give notice.
Twelve of them commented that it was of extreme importance to
give notice quickly so that the company would not accept any more
charges. Twenty-seven thought that most people would notify the
company to stop liability for misuse of a lost card. Sixteen thought
that most people would do something else such as "panic, forget
about it," "start paying cash," or "ask the gas station what to do."
Twenty-four of those with cards also were asked the two hypothetical
questions about the man who had lost his card. Thirteen thought it
fair that a holder would be liable although he did not know of the
requirement of giving notice to escape responsibility. One commented that "ignorance of the law was no excuse." Another said he
did not think that "knowledge has anything to do with it," and
another said that "not knowing is your own fault." Seven disagreed
and three had no opinion. Nine thought it fair to hold the man who
did not know his card was stolen, nine thought it was not fair and
five had no opinion. Three gave no answers for various reasons.
In order to get an impression of practices in dealing with credit
cards, interviews were also conducted with operators of sixteen service
stations in Madison, Wisconsin. Only two sold the same brand of
gasoline, and an attempt was made to talk with men who ran small
local stations, large stations on the major streets that run through the
city, stations that specialize in repair work, and stations located on
super-highways carrying traffic from Chicago to Minneapolis. Also a
restaurant manager and two managers of hotels that run popular
restaurants were interviewed to obtain information on the credit card
systems used by American Express, Carte Blanche, and the Diners
Club. All of these draw many customers from out of town-particularly on football weekends-and are moderately expensive places to
eat or stay.
All nineteen of these men were well aware of the liability-untilnotice system. On the basis of these interviews, I am willing to
guess that knowledge of the liability-until-notice system is very
widespread among those who run places that honor credit cards.
Yet, the responses in my interviews with customers at service stations
indicate that knowledge of that system and appreciation of the risks
in not giving notice, although widespread, are something less than
universal among card holders. All but two of the service station
operators interviewed said that several times a year holders of credit
cards asked them what to do about a lost card. Seven of the fortythree service station customers who held oil company cards had at
some time lost one. Four had sent notice to the company. Of the
three who did not, one waited a day and his card was returned.
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Another said she thought that her children had pushed it down
between the back and the seat of the rear seat so she had not
done anything although this had happened three months before the
interview. The final person who had lost a card waited for two
weeks and then called his Standard station to find out what to do.
From this we can guess that there are several common situations
where holders of credit cards may delay in giving or fail to give notice
when their cards are lost or stolen:
(1) While some knowledge of the liability-until-notice system may
be fairly widespread, there are some card carriers who do not know
about it. They have not read and understood the small type on their
credit cards, or, if they have, they do not remember what it said.
(2) While most people who have lost a credit card may be
aware of its disappearance and know of the system, some people
do not give notice because they are preoccupied with other affairs,
careless, or just lazy.
(3) Some may know of the system and that their card has been
lost or stolen but not appreciate the magnitude of the risk of misuse
or the urgency in giving notice. Such a person may delay because he
is busy with other things, or because he hopes he will find what he
assumes to be a misplaced card, or because he thinks he must have
left it at the last establishment where he used it.
(4) Some may know of the system, the magnitude of the risk and
the urgency of giving notice, but they may not know that they
have lost their card until the next time they want to use it or until
they receive a bill from the issuer that includes the charges of a
thief.
Finally, there is another situation suggested by several of the
service station operators. A card holder who is short of cash may
sign invoices with an atypical signature. Then when the bill comes,
he can fraudulently claim that his card was stolen and the invoices
in question were signed by another.110 If there were no liability-untilnotice system, this plot might have real possibilities for one willing
to rob from the rich (the oil company or one of the travel and
entertainment card companies) and give to the poor (himself).
Thus, even given the high awareness of the system that I found in
my spot check of service station customers, there are a number of
issues raised by an issuer who gives little, or almost no, warning of
the importance of giving immediate notice of a lost or stolen card.
First, what should be done with those who do not know what
"everyone else" knows? Essentially, this is the common problem of
imposing custom on those unaware of the folkways. Of course,
110. See note 93 supra.
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Should the legal system

treat those who don't know about liability-until-notice as if they did?
To do so would be to regulate in the service of both market function-

ing and social planning policies-we could stress the needs of large
organizations and calm our qualms about the costs to some individ-

uals by assuming that since nearly everybody knows, not too many
people will be hurt. However, before we accept this as a fact we

should have better data than that provided by my quick and unreliable
survey. My survey suggests that there may be widespread knowledge
or that people can figure out the proper response when asked a
question about lost credit cards; it gives us no precise measure of
the prevalence in the population of knowledge of the system, the
risks, and the reasons for giving immediate notice. Moreover, there
is also a value question to face: Do the benefits to the issuers in

assuming, or pretending, that everyone knows about the system,
appreciates the risks and understands the urgency outweigh the
burdens on the issuers if the legal system insisted that they give

clear warning that was understood by holders? One can appreciate
the high values of routine and standardization and the potential
difficulties in dealing with holders who try to defraud issuers by falsely
claiming to have lost their cards. Still, what are the costs of giving
meaningful warning? On the one hand, if people knew of the liability-

until-notice system, and the risks and urgency involved, some would
decide that the convenience of using credit cards was not worth the

potential costs. Of course, we have no idea how many people would
react this way today as compared to how many would assume the
risk or would buy the insurance that is readily available.1 2 Some
111. "Business goes on much better if the law in effect guarantees the usual, and
that guarantee is the more weighty and the law is more conveniently administered if
we are required to adhere to the usual in favor of all persons informed or uninformed,
except the black-hearted who know our private exceptional methods and seek to take
advantage of us." Wright, Opposition of Law to Business Usages, 26, CoLum. L. REV.
917, 921 (1926). Of course, Wrights statement leaves open the problem of classifying people as blackhearted or not. Where should we put the issuers of credit cards
who use tiny clauses on cluttered cards?
112. Insurance against losses caused by misuse of a lost or stolen credit card became
available in 1964. See e.g., Time, June 19, 1964, p. 53; N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1964, p.
34, col. 3. There are several types. One is a kind of forgery and fidelity policy usually
sold to businesses that give credit cards to executives and salesmen. The policy language, as filed in Wisconsin, reads that coverage is as follows: "Loss which the insured shall sustain through forgery or alteration of, on or in any written instrument
required in conjunction with any Credit Card issued to the Insured or to any partner,
officer or employee of the Insured or to the Insured's spouse or any child residing
permanently in the residence of the Insured; provided, however, that the Insured shall
fully comply with the provisions, conditions and other terms under which such Credit
Card shall have been issued."
(The last clause is somewhat ambiguous. Suppose a holder fails to give notice to
the issuer and is billed for charges made by an unauthorized user. Can the insurance
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issuers might prefer to see the public less sophisticated about the
dangers of credit cards. On the other hand, it is not easy to give
effective warning to all holders and potential holders. You can only
cram so much on the back of a credit card that will fit in a wallet.
Even if the warning is printed on other material sent with the card or

on the application, it is hard to be sure that it will be read. Yet the
practices of some issuers indicate that much can be done, and some
imagination undoubtedly could be applied to improve on the practices
of even the best issuers in this regard. It is every man for himself
in weighing such things, of course, but I am not convinced that such
improvement would cost the issuers much. I suspect that those issuers
who give little warning have not made a policy decision to hide the

notice requirement from the public but just have failed to think
carefully about what they are doing. I see no reason for the legal

system to support this kind of carelessness on the part of officials of
large organizations.
When we move from the few who do not know about the liability-

until-notice system and consider those who are careless, those who
do not appreciate the risks and urgency and those who have no easy
way of discovering they have lost their card until it may have been

misused for a long time, the balance of card holders' and issuers'
interests may change. I think that better warning by the issuers might
company defend against liability by asserting that the holder has not complied with
the terms of the credit card? If so, what is the holder getting for his premium?)
Suppose a business had twenty employees with credit cards and wanted $5,000 coverage for three years. What would it cost? It would pay $22 as a base price plus $11.50
plus $1.15 as the loading factors- to cover the twenty employees or a total of $34.65.
$10,000 coverage would cost $47.05. Clearly, this is not much of a charge, remembering its tax treatment, for all but the smallest businesses that are not likely to have
much need for credit cards.
Another significant kind of coverage available is an endorsement to a person's homeowner's package policy. One common form of coverage excludes liability "Unless the
Insured shall have fully complied with all terms of his credit card agreement which
deal with loss of the card." Of course, this raises similar questions to those asked in
connection with the forgery policy. In Wisconsin, and the situation in other states
should be similar, a holder can buy this endorsement for $5,000 coverage for three
years for himself for $18.00. $10,000 coverage costs $24.00. Again, clearly, this is not
particularly expensive- insurance. In a letter, A. Kent Shamblin, Assistant Regional
Director of the Insurance Information Institute comments, "We regret that we have
no information on how much of this coverage is being written. However, one company
executive we spoke to said that most businessmen who have homeowners policies are
purchasing the coverage. Businessmen would probably be more conscious of the need
for such coverage and also probably constitute most of the credit card holders."
It seems likely that the amount of coverage will turn on the industry of a businessman's insurance agent when he puts together the package involved in a home owner's
policy.
I wish to thank the Wisconsin Insurance Department, and my agent, Mr. Robert
Boylan, as well as Mr. Shamblin for help in compiling the information in this note.
See generally N.Y. Times, July 12, 1965, p. 40, cols. 2, 4-5, indicating that rates in
Wisconsin are comparable to those elsewhere.
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have a desirable impact on all of these problems. Some holders, at
least, might be less careless and would appreciate the risks. I am not
sure, however, that even with better warning the issuers' interests
would look more appealing. In any event, before the legal system
moves to favor issuers who do not give clear warning behind a dutyto-read rationale, much more needs to be known. Just what are the
advantages to the issuers in a system where little or no warning is
given? How many of the issuers' advantages would be lost if fair
warning were required and given? Fortunately, most of the data
needed to answer these questions could be assembled by the issuers
today by comparing the results of the practices of some of their
number; we only need insist that the right questions are asked and
that the issuers carry the burden of proof to establish that holders
should be treated as if they had made a contract.
To sum up at this point: One legal system policy is that the legal
system pursue its goals effectively and hesitate before trying to do
what it cannot do well. I asked whether or not the legal system may
have prompted more warning to holders from issuers. This led to an
examination of the amount of warning given in 1966 as compared to
that given in 1963 and to comparative evaluation of the warning systems of different issuers. Now we can ask what part the legal
response played in prompting the changes which are apparent from
this study.
Certainly other-than-legal sources have played an important part
in the increase in warning that has taken place. The mass media has
publicized both the liability-until-notice system and the risks involved.
The number of magazine articles and stories in the New York Times
and the Wall Street Journal has run to about three or four a year
since 1959, but before then there were very few. The publications
range widely in their readership: The American Legion Magazine,
the Commonweal, Consumer Reports, Life, Newsweek, the Reader's
Digest, Time and U.S. News and World Report as well as Banking
and Credit World have all run articles on this subject.113 Moreover, an
editor of a business magazine lost his Air Travel card and wrote an
113. The articles and stories mentioning the risk of misuse of lost or stolen cards
are:
1955
Newsweek, Jan. 3, 1955, p. 53.
Changing Times (The Kiplinger Magazine), July 1955, pp. 37, 38.
1958
American Mecury, June 1958, pp. 91, 97.
U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 24, 1958, pp. 38, 39.
1959
The Commonweal, Nov. 13, 1959, pp. 206, 207.
Consumer Reports, Mar. 1959, pp. 140, 143.
Life, June 1, 1959, pp. 120, 123-24.
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account of the over 4,000 dollars worth of charges that were run up
by someone misusing the card.11 4 This story was privately circulated
to about 100 or 150 editors of business magazinesn-part of the credit

card issuers' public. The ideas were there to see; we can assume that
many credit card holders read these stories and were warned. A
number of insurance companies began issuing policies covering losses
from misuse of a lost or stolen credit card, and in their advertising they
probably warned a lot of people." 6 The credit card issuers also provided some warning through publicity. Good warning given by one

issuer may splash over and educate people about the system used by
issuers that specialize in obscure phrases. Moreover, in the early
1960's, Carte Blanche tried to reassure the public by pointing to its
1960
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1960, p. 47, col. 3.
Wall St. J., April 26, 1960, p. 1, col. 1, at 10, cols. 3-4.
1961
Banking, Feb. 1961, p. 60.
N.Y. Herald Tribune, Mar. 12, 1961, § 6, pp. 6-7, reprinted in Reader's Digest,
April 1961, p. 63.
1962
Horizon, May 1962, pp. 118, 119.
N.Y. Times, June 19, 1962, p. 37, col. 6; id., Sept. 14, 1962, p. 2, col. 4.
1963
The Credit World, Nov. 1963, pp. 9, 10-11.
N.Y. Times, July 2, 1963, p. 15, col. 1.
Wall St. J., July 2, 1963, p. 20, col. 2.
1964
The American Legion Magazine, May 1964, p. 17.
Time, June 19, 1964, p. 53.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1964, p. 31, col. 6; id. at 34, col. 3.
1965
N.Y. Times, July 12, 1965, p. 40, col. 2; id., Feb. 8, 1965, p. 38, cols. 2-3.
Wall St. J., July 8, 1965, p. 16, cols. 6-7.
1966
N.Y. Times, May 15, 1966, § 3, p. 1, col. 1.
San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 4, 1966, p. 51, col. 1.
114. Spector, Credit Cards Revisited or What to Do Until the FBI Comes, Banking,
Feb. 1961, p. 60.
115. Interview with Mr. Specto.
116. Aetna's leaflet is entitled "The Case of the Missing Credit Cards," and it states
in big type that "Personal Credit Card Forgery Protection Can Save You Hundreds of
Dollars ...." The St. Paul Insurance Companies' leaflet states, "Loss of Your Credit
Cards Can Mean a Serious Financial Loss to You." (Interestingly, the Aetna leaflet
says, "Of the 70 million credit cards in the U.S. at least 1,500,000 are lost each year,
and of these 60,000 are stolen. It is estimated that purchases charged with a stolen
credit card average $500." This is a paraphrase of the Time magazine paraphrase of
the article in The American Legion Magazine. See notes 49-50 supra. These figures
were an estimate by the manager of the American Oil Company's Central Credit Office
in Chicago. Since I have repeated the numbers, I suppose that now I can be cited
for the proposition.)
During the time this article was being written, in the summer of 1966, a Madison
insurance agency broadcast a commercial, advertising credit card insurance, on a local
radio station at a time when many businessmen were driving to work.
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computers that could detect unusual patterns of spending."' Carte
Blanche later went into the business of selling insurance against losses
caused by misuse of cards and the Diners Club soon followed suit.
Finally, American Express, then followed by Diners Club introduced
its 100-dollars-deductible system and began advertising it as a selling
tool for its cards. It looks as if the increase in warning from other
sources may have presented the possibility that potential holders
might be scared off. In the attempt to turn this problem to their
competitive advantage, Carte Blanche, the Diners Club and American
Express further increased the total level of warning.
What then was the contribution of the legal response? It is
impossible to be sure, but we have some, clues. Union Oil Co. v. Lull'18
was decided in 1960, and left the issuers in a most uncertain position
because of its intimation that a jury might find that the fine print on
the back of a card was not part of a contract and its placing on the
issuers the burdens of proving due care and that goods were actually
delivered to the man who misused the card. The New York statute
was passed in April of 1961. By November of that year, Texaco, in
response to the statute, had changed its application blanks to advertise
its liability-until-notice system.119 Somewhere between 1962 and 1964,
Texaco, Sinclair, Mobil and Shell all made changes in the type face or
color contrast of the liability-until-notice provisions on their cards.
All do a great deal of business in New York, and have good reason to
comply with its statute. For the most part, those oil companies
surveyed that give less warning do not market in New York.
Even the three travel and entertainment cards' interest in selling
insurance or providing a 100-dollars-deductible system may flow from
a legal response. In 1964, the Diners Club sued a television director
for 1,622.29 dollars, charged on his stolen card.120 Despite the language
on the card and material accompanying it, the court, in effect, followed the Lull case and imposed a duty of care to see that "irregular
charges . . . [were] not unnecessarily incurred."' 2 ' This case could
have convinced the three that their efforts to put liability on card
holders were not worth the costs. Certainly, the parallels in time
could be just coincidence. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the general
ambiguity of the legal response outside of New York and the lack
of certainty that resulted plus the demands of the New York statute
that held out the promise of increased certainty, were an influence
117. See note 101 supra.
118. 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
119. I have reason to believe that Texaco wanted to have its legal position clear
in New York where it has many card holders and thought that if other states were to
pass statutes that they would be similar to the New York legislation.
120. Diners Club, Inc. v. Whited, supra note 73.
121. Ibid.
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in prompting the greater degree of warning that exists today as
compared to the situation in the early 1960's. House counsel for
American Express commented,
As long as the creditor or the issuer gives notice in the manner prescribed
in the [New York] statute, the cardholder will be liable for all charges
until he gives the creditor or issuer notice of the loss or theft of the card.
There is no more speculation on this point. However, this is a statute and
must be literally complied'with in all respects, if we are to hold the cardholder liable.12

In a sense, then, the legal response had impact on warning both when
it was extremely uncertain and when it provided certainty of sorts (the
New York statute can be read to require only eight point type or to
require "conspicuousness" tested on a case-by-case basis). One must
decide which goal-protecting the expectations of the parties in the
particular transaction or providing a rule of fair warning-is best in
order to evaluate these impacts. However, in the absence of much by
way of input of information about the problems .and little feedback
about the consequences of past cases, it is striking that an ambiguous
legal response prompted officials of the issuers to police themselves.
In other words, it is not always necessary for the legal system to set
out to regulate to provide leverage for change. Telling large organizations no more than that they must be fair sometimes works. Inputs
and feedback caused no long-run problems when the goal was warning
or even affecting the likely expectations of holders. Yet the haphazard
process has not produced perfection. Some applications and cards
still hide the liability-until-notice clause, and not everyone has full
knowledge about the system, the risks and the urgency involved.
Probably more can be done through giving issuers incentives to tell
people about these things.
(2) Regulation in the Service of Relief-of-Hardship and Social
Planning.-Continuing our discussion of the legal system policy of
efficacy and efficiency, now we will shift our focus from the goal of
maximizing warning and knowledge to regulating for other than
market ends. Some judges who decided lost or stolen credit card
cases wanted to decide cases or make rules in light of relief-of-hardship or social planning policies. How effective were they? To what
extent were they troubled by insufficient inputs of information about
the problem and the lack of feedback on the consequences of the
legal response that had gone before?
(a) Good Faith, Due Care 'and the Balance of Negligence.-The
most conventional approach is to' construe some additional terms into
122. O'Connor, The Triple Threat to Credit-Fraud-Overloads-Bankruptcies,Credit

World, Nov. 1963, pp. 9, 11.
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the contract. Impliedly both issuers and holders can be held to
have promised to deal with each other in good faith and to use
reasonable care in handling credit card transactions and in protecting
the credit card against loss or theft. Such a construction may come
close to the actual sense of the agreement between the parties. If so,
then this is a transactional approach. But even if one or both parties
failed to consider the matter, the courts favoring such a construction
would probably impose it. Finding the proper policy "pigeon hole"
then would depend on how these vague standards were applied. Such
a rule could be thought to aid the functioning of the market or to
blunt it by imposing an unwanted burden on large organizations that
have attempted to avoid anything beyond a liability-until-notice
system.
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of cases that seem to want to
solve the lost or stolen card problem on the basis of good faith and
due care. The holder of the card could take a number of steps. He
could record his card numbers and the addresses of the issuers so he
would be prepared to give notice if he lost his cards. He could
develop habits of care concerning the cards-he could be sure to check
to see he had his card after each time he used it and he could avoid
carrying unnecessary cards in crowds or other places where his wallet
was likely to be stolen. But all of this requires an awareness of the
risks of being a holder of a credit card and of the magnitudes of those
risks. That, in turn, depends on warning from the companies, a problem with which I have already dealt. The issuers know all about the
risks and their magnitude. Too many have been careless or timid
in letting the holders of their cards in on this information.
What about the other side? How much care do the issuers use
and could more be demanded? In order to get an impression of
practices in dealing with credit cards, it will be recalled that interviews
were conducted with the operators of sixteen service stations in
Madison, Wisconsin, one restaurant manager and two managers of
hotels with popular restaurants.
The primary leverage device used by most credit card issuers to
control the practices of the man who accepts the card and writes an
invoice is the circulation of a list of numbers of invalid cards. If the
service station or restaurant accepts a card on the list, the issuer will
not pay the station or restaurant for the charge-thus if the issuer
has no right to hold the man who lost the card because he has given
notice, it can move the burden of this loss to those who take the
cards. For example, Carte Blanche, the smallest of the three travel and
entertainment card companies, in June of 1966 issued a thirty-nine page
booklet of credit card numbers not to be accepted. Of course, not
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all numbers represented stolen cards as issuers cancel cards for nonpayment of bills. Shell Oil Company, in June of 1966, issued ten
legal size pages with a list of 578 invalid card numbers to its Chicago
area (including Madison, Wisconsin) dealers. The travel and entertainment card issuers send out such bulletins as often as once a week.
The oil companies tend to send them only monthly but also send
special letters when they know a card is being used in a particular
area. All of the issuers represented in my interviews used this general
kind of system. In addition, almost all of them offer a reward to
employees of the places that take their cards if they pick up an
invalid one. The rewards range from five to one hundred dollars, but
ten to twenty-five dollars seems to be the most common amount.
In most cases where you find a formal system, it is wise to find out
whether or not anyone pays any attention to it, and if so, when. How
does the list system work? Although it may not be a typical case, the
list system seems to work beautifully at the Madison restaurant. When
a customer gives a waitress a card, she takes it to the hostess who
looks at the person presenting it and makes a judgment based on his
appearance and checks to see that the card has not expired. The
cashier then takes the card, checks it against the list of invalid numbers
and writes out the charge invoice. The waitress takes the card and
the invoice to the customer who signs. The signature on the card and
the invoice are compared and the transaction is over. If there is any
question, the cashier can telephone New York or Chicago where the
issuer has someone on duty twenty-four hours a day. While the
customer awaits the waitress' return, the issuer can call Madison police
to come and make an arrest. In all cases, except the use of a card at
the bar, the cashier is supposed to check the list of invalid numbers.
Transactions at the bar are too chaotic for the use of the list but
only relatively small amounts are involved. The cashier does use the
list except for occasional lapses which are said to be rare. The
cashier at this restaurant recently spotted a forged signature. One
of the hotel and restaurant managers said his establishment followed
similar procedures, but his answers indicated that the lists were not
checked quite so often. The other hotel and restaurant manager told
a different story:
The type of people we deal with aren't usually the type that try to pass off
phony cards .... We never [have] had a lost or stolen card come through
The most important thing, as far as rm conhere to my knowledge ....
cerned, is that we would embarrass our clients too much by... checking
their cards against the lost and stolen list ....
People who are checking out are usually in a hurry for one reason or
another.

Apparently, this establishment seldom checks cards against the list.
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Ten of the sixteen service station operators indicated that they
checked the list of invalid numbers only when they were suspicious
or ignored it entirely and took the risk of any losses caused by accepting a card mentioned on it. The comments of those who said they
checked when they were suspicious indicated that they did not look
very often. One confessed, after saying he checked when suspicious,
that he regularly threw away the lists since he never looked at them.
Four complained that the lists were long and hard to use. Three gave
incorrect answers as to the amount of reward by their companies
and two said they did not know. In Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 23 the
Oregon court thought that a jury could say that an attendant should
be suspicious when a card with an Oregon address was offered by a
man driving a car with Idaho license plates. However, oil company
credit cards no longer bear addresses. 12 4 One dealer said he knew
his company's code for areas in the credit card number and that he
could check this way. However, another dealer said that in a
university town one gets many students driving cars with Wisconsin
plates but using credit cards issued to their parents living in other
areas. Eight of the sixteen stressed how busy they were in rush periods
and that the other customers would not wait if an attendant took
any extra time with one customer. Since none had experienced any
significant losses as a result of accepting invalid cards, they had little
incentive to be extra-cautious. Finally, ten of the sixteen seldom,
if ever, recorded a customer's license number on the charge invoice. 125
Only the Shell, Enco and Sunray DX dealers said their companies
insisted on this. Texaco requires it on charges over ten dollars.
A few dealers seemed to use more care than the others. One
recently had lost about eight dollars because he had accepted a bad
card, and he was keenly aware of the problem. The employees of the
Standard dealer interviewed said they looked at the list often since
they were eager to collect the twenty-five dollars reward. Conversely,
the employees of the Consolidated station 1 6 where we asked questions
123. Supra note 118.

124. Most no longer bear signatures, and so the station attendant cannot compare
what is written on the card with the signature on the charge slip. "One protection
which many card holders feel they have is their signature on their cards. Not so, say
the issuing companies. We can't ask every gas station attendant, waitress and store
clerk to be a handwriting expert. .

.

. The purpose of the signature is mainly to deter

amateurs, since professionals generally come up with a pretty acceptable forgery."
Angus, Don't Lose Your Credit Cards, The American Legion Magazine, May 1964,
p. 17.
125. If a dealer records the license number, it may be easier to find the person

using the lost or stolen card. It is my impression that stations on major highways are
more likely to record license numbers.
126. Consolidated has stations only in Wisconsin and has far fewer credit card
holders than the major oil companies.

1966 ]

DUTY TO READ

iiii

always look, since company policy is that the attendant pays for any
invalid cards he accepts, and this policy is enforced rigorously. Moreover, Consolidated's list is shorter than any of the other companies',
and there is only one imprinter at the station and the invalid numbers
are prominently displayed near it. A Texaco dealer pointed out that
dealers could take a little more time to check lists since before

dealers had
plastic credit cards and imprinters were used in stations,
27

to write out much more on the charge invoices.
The picture is not one of a great deal of care at all establishments;
those places that accept American Express, Diners Club or Carte
Blanche cards probably are more careful than the service stations,
but even in the case of hotels and restaurants, one suspects practices

often are lax because of a desire not to offend customers or because
of unwillingness to take the extra time to check signatures and lists
coupled with an absence of bad experiences. Certainly issuers could
increase rewards and devise ways of making the lists easier to use.
They also could establish a continuing campaign to keep awareness

of the problem at a high level.
However, the problem may not seem like one worth all this trouble
to some issuers of cards. Some oil companies do not even put out

lists of lost or stolen cards to be checked by their dealers. In 1958,
the Wall Street Journal reported that some oil companies had ended
"stop orders" that tell their stations that a card is being misused.

One oil company that dropped stop orders insists it's cheaper to take losses.
'It's basically a matter of cost,' explains a credit man. 'Shrewd operators
nail us for a card. But
that know the ins and outs of this game sometimes
1 28
it would cost too much to button up these areas.'
127. The imprinter that is now used by all issuers and those that accept their cards
apparently was introduced by Standard Oil Company of California in 1952. See
Business Week, April 26, 1952, p. 44.
128. Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1958, p. 1, col. 1, p. 17, cols. 2-3. See also the following:
"To keep better track of lost and stolen credit cards, and to make this information
known quickly to those in a position to grant credit, some companies are beginning to
turn to electronic data processing. The initial steps are being taken in the retailing
industry, where a single store or a closely knit store division can be linked with a
computer, but some experts foresee the time when large numbers of service stations or
airline reservation desks can all be linked to the same system.
"One credit executive at a major oil company explains that 'right now the cost would
be prohibitive to connect all of our thousands of stations throughout the country to a
central computer. If all of our service stations were in one little building, we could
do what the stores are doing.'
"Companies have traditionally used lists of numbers of 'had' or 'wild' cards that
were sent to service station owners or clerks at retail counters. Theoretically, these
people were supposed to check these cancellation lists on every credit-card transactionat least those above a specified amount, such as $10 or $15-to make sure that the cards
were still to be honored.
"For instance, in the oil industry as soon as a company discovers its card is being
used fraudulently, it will usually circulate that particular number to its dealers in that
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Apparently, Clark, Enco, Gulf, Mobil, Phillips, Shell, Sinclair and
Skelly follow this practice. All respond to a notice from a holder
that he has lost his card by issuing the customer another credit card
with the same number.'2 Thus there is no way to track down the
stolen one. Along with the replacement card, all of these companies
send a letter written in remarkably similar language. Mobils version
of this standard letter reads:
Thank you for telling us about the loss of your Mobil Credit Card. A replacement card with the same number is enclosed.
In our exprience, only rarely is a lost or stolen credit card used fraudulently.
If this should happen, however, you are relieved of responsibility for payment from the date of your notification.
In your own interest, if any fraudulent charges appear in your future
monthly billings, you should return them to us promptly so that we may
investigate and issue proper credit to your account.
Again, our appreciation for calling this to our attention.

Standard of Indiana formerly followed this system, but sometime after
the fall of 1963 changed its procedure and now issues new numbers
when it receives notice. Texaco issues the same number but marks
the replacement cards as "DUPLICATE." The number is put on the
list, and stations are to accept only the duplicate cards. Kerr-McGee
and Pure issue a new number and put the old one on the list sent to
their dealers. Clearly, where companies reissue the same number,
care in checking the list at their stations is irrelevant to the problem
area. Some companies offer service station owners a $25 reward if they come up with
a lost or stolen credit card being used improperly.
"However, in busy periods-or even in not-so-busy periods when a lazy person is
involved-gas station employes or salesgirls may not take the time to check their lists.
• ..In any event, some cards that for one reason or another should not be used are
re-used time after time, at great expense to the issuer." N.Y. Times, May 15, 1968,
§ 3, p. 1, col. 1.
129. Probably new numbers are not issued because of the demands of data processing
systems. It is expensive to remove a number from a data processing machine tape, and
there is always the risk that one will remove the wrong number or several numbers.
The situation is similar to that of the large banks that no longer read endorsements or
large firms that never have read the terms and conditions on the back of business forms.
The costs of procedures attuned to the legal system's demands are too great to
justify the gains.
I reported most of my collection of credit cards as lost to test the responses of the
issuers. I had a number of responses to such reports from friends and students, but
I thought it essential to see how widespread the reissuing of the same number was in
light of my views about the consequences of this practice. Of course, my experiment
involved deception, and this is troublesome. See, e.g., SHILS, SOCL INQUIRY AND TnE
AUTONOMY

OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE HUMAN MEANING OF THE SocIL

SCMNcFS

(Lerner ed. 1959). However, I was not manipulating individuals and there was little
danger to the corporate personality of the issuers "tricked." I got what I wanted to
know at less cost to them and me than had I written all of the top executives involved
and asked. I was not the first to discover this practice. For a humorous account of
being issued three cards with the same number as the result of leaving a card at a
station, see the Wall St. J.,
July 8, 1965, p. 16, col. 6.
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of lost or stolen cards. If one follows the Oregon court, such practices
would entitle a jury to conclude that the issuer was doing nothing to
minimize losses that turned on the holder's giving notice-in short, that
it was not exercising due care.
Apart from the list system, the courts in both the Lull'30 and
Plotnick'3 l cases were worried about a thief using a stolen card to run
up a large bill with the help of obliging station attendants. An attendant can give one presenting a card money from the cash drawer
and write up tires or repairs on a credit card. This may still go on
fairly frequently. Ten of our sixteen Madison dealers said that they
had been asked to make loans this way. Only two said they had
done it, two thought it dishonest, and the rest made denials that did
not always convince the interviewer. The two who had made credit
card loans-those who admitted it-stressed they would do it only
for well-known customers. Perhaps this is so; perhaps not. Of course,
the vice in this practice is that it can drastically increase the amount
of the bill run up by one misusing a credit card. One may well delay
a day or two to see if he finds his "lost" credit cards before giving
notice to the company if he thinks his exposure is only a few tanks
of gas and perhaps some tires. Yet the bill can be a good deal more
with the help of kindly station attendants. Moreover, the oil companies themselves have recently added to the risks involved in losing
one of their cards by expanding their coverage. With a Standard of
Indiana card one can now charge bills at Best Western Motels; with
a Gulf card one can charge bills at the Holiday Inn chain; and with
a Conoco card one can write checks for up to thirty dollars.
Thus, many issuers will have problems if a balance of negligence
test is used since their control over those who take their charge slips
has not been used to establish due care. Sympathetic juries could
relieve the hardship of making a holder pay and dump the loss on
the large and wealthy organizations, and this could be done with a
clear conscience since one can rationally conclude that the loss is
more the issuer's fault than the holder's. Is this a good thing? It comes
close to the social planning policy position suggested earlier-the legal
system should force issuers to swallow all or most of the loss, since
they can spread the loss and can better absorb it than many individuals. It is useful to evaluate the negligence approach with this version
of social engineering. By contrasting a balance of due care standard
with a rule holding the issuer absolutely liable despite any clauses,
we can better weigh the gains and costs of each.
(b) Liability Without Choice or Fault on the Issuer.-To what
130. Union Oil Co. v. Lull, supra note 118.
131. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C. P. Lancaster 1935).

1114

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 19

extent has the legal system helped push the issuers to take losses
from lost or stolen credit cards? Let us begin by asking to what extent
the issuers themselves have done it. In November of 1965, American
Express established a 100 dollars deductible system. The holder is
liable for no charges after he gives notice and only for the first
100 dollars before he gives notice. The Diners Club now has the
same system. In addition, it offers an insurance policy against loss
or theft of other cards that members can buy. Both appear, at least
in part, to be a response to lost credit card insurance offered by
Carte Blanche in 1965. The Airline Travel card, the car rental cards
and the oil company cards have made no such changes. Formally,
they still tell the world that a holder must pay for misuse before he
gives notice. However, Time reported, "Most major credit card companies grimly absorb these losses themselves." 13 Another magazine
reported that some companies attempt to collect from their holders
but that others do not.1' The New York Times reported a story where
the finder of a lost card bought tires from stations and resold them
to get cash. "The credit card thief was apprehended soon thereafter,
the oil company decided to absorb the loss and so the story ended
happily as far as the woman was concerned." 34 Two service station
operators thought that their company would never enforce its right
against a holder. Of course, some oil companies pursue holders
vigorously; one of my students reports he had to pay Standard of
Indiana over 100 dollars for charges made with his stolen card. Apparently, at one time at least, the Airline Travel card also stalked
its holders vigorously to collect such charges. 135 In summary, while
sometimes issuers attempt to collect from holders for charges made
by misuse of a lost card, some issuers do not always assert what may
be their legal rights and American Express and Diners Club have
scaled down their claim to the first 100 dollars charged before notice
is given.
What has been the relative role of the legal system in all this? On
132. Time, June 19, 1964, p. 53.

133. The American Legion Magazine, May 1964, p. 17.
134. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1965, § 3, p. 1, col. 1.
135. In one case, however, a man used a stolen Air Travel card to run up between
$4,000 and $5,000 in charges. The holder settled with the air line involved for only
$150 because the signatures on the charge invoices were such poor forgeries that it was
obvious that no one at the airline ticket offices or hotels had ever compared signatures.
According to the terms of this contract the holder was liable for all charges for thirty
days after notice was given. Apparently, the air line decided that its case looked too
much like Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945),
to attempt to sue for more. Undoubtedly, the legal response to lost and stolen credit
cards has had some impact on the settlement practices of the issuers, but this is an
area that would be most difficult to investigate. Of course, this difficulty does not lessen
its obvious importance.
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one hand, there have been a number of non-legal factors involved
since credit card issuers often have a perfectly good reason to absorb
losses-that is, to keep customers. Moreover, if credit cards were
known as ultra-hazardous, presumably fewer people would use them,
and this would not please most issuers. As we have seen there has
been a good deal of publicity, in magazines and newspapers often
read by those who hold cards, about the risk of having to pay for a
lost or stolen card. The insurance companies didn't help keep the
secret either when they jumped in with their own policies covering
losses from stolen cards and advertised them. Still the legal response
may have been a factor in the decision to swallow some of the lossesthe legal situation was ambiguous outside of New York and one writer
says he was told that the mixed legal reaction to the liability-untilnotice system influenced some issuers not to pursue holders. 136 Moreover, in 1964 the Diners Club sued one of its holders for 1,622.29
dollars charged by a thief on a lost card. 137 Despite the liabilityuntil-notice clause on the card, the issuer was held to owe the holder
a duty of due care to see that charges were not unnecessarily incurred.
Coupled with the entire history of legal reaction outside of New York,
this must have been discouraging to the attorneys for the credit card
issuers. The drastic changes in the travel and entertainment cards
and the attempts to turn them into merchandising ploys followed.
Still we cannot be sure whether the business and legal responses
reflect cause or coincidence.
In order to assess the costs of a lack of inputs and feedback, we
must ask whether or not we like what has happened. Is liability without fault desirable or should we retain a negligence concept? One
can argue for refusing to allow the issuers to dump this cost on holders.
Issuers can absorb or spread the loss better than most individuals.
Issuers benefit from the system, and their own practices may have
created a false sense of security on the part of many holders who
do not read fine print. But there are some things to be said on the
other side. Issuers do not absorb all of the loss but move some of it
to their dealers or those who accept their cards through the list system.
Given the difficulties of using many of the lists and the fact that many
places accepting cards are not much better loss spreaders or absorbers
than individuals, is this a desirable result? If not, could the legal
system prevent it short of using a high cost enforcement agency?
Then, too, four of the Madison area service station operators interviewed expressed concern that holders would cheat by claiming a
card was stolen when they found themselves in financial diffilculty
136. The American Legion Magazine, supra note 133.
137. Diners Club, Inc. v. Whited, Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964.
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and did not want to pay the bill, or that holders would be even more
careless with cards than they are now. Certainly many people keep
credit cards in the glove compartments of their cars, 1' and this makes
theft pretty easy. One cannot be sure that people would not be even
more careless if they ran no risk of liability; certainly the glove compartment is a convenient place for oil company cards and it reduces a
bulging wallet. Finally, some issuers do exert great efforts to catch
those who misuse cards, and quick notice of loss or theft is important
to them. Without some possible liability, what would be the incentive
for writing the issuer when a card was lost? Perhaps rewards could
be given for quick notice-but there is always a risk that the reward
would not be worth the effort for many card carriers. If the issuers
are going to announce that they will take responsibility, rather than
just not enforce their rights except where they suspect fraud, perhaps
the 100 dollars deductible approach of American Express and the
Diners Club is best. Some incentives for quick notice are left, and
it is hard to cheat, but an extremely burdensome potential liability
is lifted. This would be a difficult solution for a court to reach, and
a little unorthodox even for legislation. An ambiguous legal response,
plus publicity, plus market pressures may be the only route to this
destination. Yet, if we are left with this version of negligence in the
service of social planning policy, much turns on the warning given
the holder. Unless he knows about the risks, his duty to notify and
his liability until he does, negligence should equal absolute liability for
the issuers.
So much for negligence and liability on the issuer without choice
or fault. What about inputs and feedback in this area? The first
thing to be noticed is that the attempts to regulate in this direction
have not resulted in disaster. The systems continue and the credit
card issuers have prospered. At most, the cases have served to bring
the problems to the attention of top decision-makers in these organizations who could work out their own solutions. Still one can be uneasy
about attempts to influence practices at the service station or restaurant level where lists of invalid numbers often are not checked when
cards are presented, where holders absent-mindedly leave credit cards
to be picked up by the dishonest or where loans are made and written
up as tires. What degree of suspicion can we demand of a gas station
attendant or a cashier? What are the burdens as we increase the
138. My collection of 1963 credit cards largely came from one of my colleagues who
then drove a Volkswagen bus which had an open bin instead of a glove compartment.
He kept from five to ten cards scattered in this bin so that when he wanted to stop for
gasoline while driving on an interstate expressway he would have the appropriate
card handy. Undoubtedly, it was convenient but risky. But, then, it has long been
clear that law professors are not reasonable men.
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amount of care required? However, it is easy to talk of spreading
losses and the "deep pocket" to justify liability without choice or
fault on the issuers. Putting the question of political philosophy
aside, will judges or legislators be able to predict the impact of such
a rule on the attitudes and practices of card holders-can we be sure
that the risk of liability is not significant in deterring fraud and promoting care? Can judges or legislators find out if they make the wrong
guess? Perhaps they can make good guesses, but the probability of
being right certainly increases if the guess is a conscious prediction
made with at least some awareness of the problems.
(c) Liability Without Choice or Fault on the Holder.-Our last
regulatory target to evaluate is the market functioning policy which
imposes absolute liability on the holder as found in the Magnolia'3 9
and Goldstein40 cases. There, bureaucratic considerations pushed the
court to decide that the holder was bound by the fine print apart from
any notion of warning to him. The duty to read served to justify the
result. Why? First, we should recall that many firms do nothing with
the notice once it is received and routinely reissue a card with the
same number. If the legal system says, in effect, that the holder is
responsible in those cases, then all we have is a crude and arbitrary
form of loss splitting. The companies can rely on inattention to personal affairs, carelessness and lack of awareness of the system to cause
many holders to fail to give notice until the first statement with charges
by a thief is sent. After this, they almost always will hear from the
holder. Roughly, it may equal the Airline Travel card's liability for
thirty days after notice as a device to move a burden to the holder. But
why allocate the loss this capriciously? Holder and issuer could share
it equally or a jury could try its hand at a comparative negligence
approach with more justification. Second, there is the argument of
the Goldsteinl case. Issuers are big organizations with a need to
standardize and to reduce complexity to routine. Undoubtedly there
is truth in this. Moreover, those who accept cards-attendants and
cashiers-cannot be held to an extremely high standard of care. They
do not want to embarrass customers. They often are rushed, and they
often are people not accustomed to bureaucratic routine and paper
work. Moreover, they are not trained to be detectives. Nonetheless,
why not insist that the issuers give the holders fair warning in a
meaningful way? What are the costs of this warning? Would it be
an idle gesture in our careless affluent society? I would think that the
issuers would have the burden of proof on questions such as these.
139. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
140. Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Munic. Ct.
N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 39 Misc. 2d 552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
141. The full argument is quoted in the text accompanying note 72, supra.
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The court in the Goldstein case rushed past all of these issues in a
zeal to promote the interests of large organizations. Maybe this was
justified, but it is hard to see why. Perhaps more facts than I have
been able to discover would justify dispensing with any requirement
that issuers warn holders. Perhaps some would be convinced if a
random sample of the adult population showed that the overwhelming
proportion of the population knew of both the duty to give notice
and the magnitude of the risks involved. Perhaps more would be
convinced if a good study showed that the reasons most holders fail
to give notice are that they are lazy, reckless or attempting to cheat
the companies by running up large bills and claiming that the charges
were made by another. But at this point, I am content to argue that
the burden of going forward with such evidence should be on the
issuers who have the time and resources to make such a case if it
can be made. I doubt that it can be.
(3) Conclusions About Efficacy and Efficiency.-This discussion

of consequences all began with the question of whether or not the
legal system was operating effectively in this area-a reflection of
the system policy that courts and legislatures ought to hesitate before
they try to do what they do not do well. After all of this evaluation,
what have we learned about this system policy? First, those decisions
that tried to regulate seemed to be shooting in the dark. With a
relatively primitive field survey, I was able to raise a host of questions
about the consequences of various approaches. Yet, I had more time
and resources than are available to most lawyers for holders. Unless
as a matter of principle a holder wanted to spend 5000 to 10,000 dollars to fight a 2000 dollar charge, the judiciary would seem to lack
much of the essential inputs for a regulatory decision either favoring
issuer or holder. Perhaps the New York legislature had more information. Certainly members of the committee could contact representatives of the major issuers since most are based in New York City. Yet
not all my conclusions are entirely pleasing to issuers. Unless the
issuers' representatives were moved by an unusual degree of candor,
I would not suppose that the legislative committee would have heard
all that is reported here.
Moreover, the legal system suffers from a lack of systematic feedback. A rule is made, and it may or may not have desirable consequences. If the result is outrageous, there is likely to be a response.
But if the result hits those not organized to make use of the legal
system, we must depend on a case coming before a court (in the
teeth of all the costs of litigation that reaches the appellate stage)
or a legislative champion taking up the matter as a cause. Furthermore, when data are hard to come by, a trial and error approach is
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probably the best we can expect. Over-generalizations and plain
mistakes can be corrected in the next case. Yet often the odds are
against a court getting enough cases to work out a sensible solution
to a problem or a legislature getting a chance to reconsider the actions
of a past session. Certainly in the credit card area one cannot find a
line of cases building on one another in a way that would give one
confidence that good solutions are being worked out by trial and
error. Rather, each case seems to begin to regulate anew. There is
no indication that the New York legislature has ever reconsidered the
impact of its statute. The issuers of credit cards probably are happy,
but those hit by the statute's provisions are individuals who hold cards
and who are not organized in any well-defined interest group.
Another potential source of data and argument is legal scholarship,
and credit cards have been a favorite of the law reviews. The introduction of American Express and Carte Blanche cards in the late
1950's and the LullI ' and Goldstein 43 cases prompted one flurry
of law review comments. The Diners Club'44 case in 1964 prompted
another. A few articles attempted to go beyond drawing analogies
to other areas where large organizations issued formal documents
and attempted to deal with the likely consequences of the legal response. Although a few indicated an awareness of some of the likely
consequences of the various approaches, 145 the data gathered for these
comments were not used to study the entire on-going systems involved
in credit card relationships. Even if all the studies in the reviews had
been examples of the kind of feedback needed, there is no regular
channel whereby they will be drawn on by the system. We still rely
on the accident of an attorney or a legislative staff member discovering
an article that can be found in a not always reliable index. Thus, one
can conclude that there is some feedback from the consequences of
legal action, but it is pretty haphazard.
The input and feedback difficulties I have described prompt me
to counsel caution in regulating in ways far removed from transactional policy. As long as we leave the individual with a fair and
realistic chance to protect himself, at least some of the errors of
a generally haphazard approach to facts about problems and consequences of solutions may not plague us as much as when we remove
this safety valve. From this standpoint we are safest when our legal
standard asks whether the people in question know about an obligation or have a good reason for not knowing, somewhat less safe when
we set up rules designed to define arbitrarily when fair warning is
142.
143.
144.
145.

Union Oil Co. v. Lull, supra note 118.
Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, supra note 140.
Diners Club, Inc. v. Whited, supra note 137.
See 30 ALBANY L. REV. 79 (1966); 35 NoRmE DAME LAw. 225 (1960).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 19

given, and in the most trouble when we begin imposing absolute
liability blindly.
(4) Democratic Control.-The final legal system policy is that of
democratic control. Those whose connection with an electorate is at
best tenuous, such as judges, ought to hesitate before plunging into
serious shifts of policy. But what is such a shift? Credit cards are a
new area, and the open analogies are so numerous that a judge has
wide choice. One can stress expectations and reliance, one can talk
of unfair surprise from fine print, one can impose a strict duty to read,
one can talk due care and good faith, and one can talk of the rules
about a gratuitous indemnitor, an open letter of credit or exculpation
clauses. The one case that stretches beyond tradition is Texaco, Inc.
v. Goldstein,46 if I am right that it represents liability without fault
imposed on the holder. Of course, the negligence approach of Union
Oil Co. v. Lull'47 could be manipulated to impose absolute liability
the other way. One can say simply, who asked the judges to regulate
this far from the common law tradition. Of course, there is the expedient answer: this problem is not the kind likely to be handled by
legislation, it needs solution and each court had an opportunity to
save time and effort by solving it. If the rule selected is poor, the
legislature can veto it. Of course, if this tack is adopted, a judge must
think about the burden of taking action. The legislature has no effective veto if a rule favors the powerful and hits those who are not
organized to battle and lobby.
And what of legislation and democratic control? Is it a fiction here?
If so, is a proper role of the judiciary to protect individuals against
those with political power? But if this be deemed an appropriate
activity, how does a judge decide when the representative system is
or is not working? To some extent holders of credit cards are unorganized in the sense that they are not a recognizable voting block.
Yet holders of Air Travel cards-the most dangerous cards in terms
of exposure to risk of charges run up by a thief-have high socioeconomic status, and probably enough political influence to get legislative action against outrage cases. Holders of oil company cards are
not necessarily so well off economically or politically. These questions
are and can be only suggestive of the difficulty involved in deciding
that drastic change through judicial legislation is called for because
of defects in the legislative process. Conversely, we cannot blithely
assume that because judges have less direct contacts with an electorate
than legislators or because certain tasks adulterate the purity of some
ideal conception of the judicial role, that our society is necessarily
146. Supra note 140.
147. Supra note 118.
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better off if judges merely passively support the powerful. Perhaps
some things need doing and inaction may have costs far higher than
any judicially-centered theory is worth. Perhaps the search should
be for the best possible, or least bad, allocation of necessary functions
among all the units of the legal system in light of practical realities
rather than the perfection of the judiciary. This is not the place for
a complete examination of such issues, but one cannot often look at a
problem effectively without some idea of such system policies and
at least a working resolution of the difficulties.
V.

CONCLUSION

The example of the kinds of things I see in the concept of a duty
to read indicates what a complex problem is inherent in a simple
slogan. I suspect that an equally lengthy essay would result if one
were to look to the operation of the whole cluster of duty to read
rules as they apply to the sale of residential real estate, insurance
releases, personal injury disclaimers found in instruction manuals to
consumer items, and the other areas where documents and actual
understanding is alleged to conflict. I think it is clear that it will help
to ask in each area to what extent standardization is valuable. Do
we care about the actual or likely expectations of the one trying to
avoid the written document or are we content if he had a fighting
chance to protect himself? Do we want to aid those who promulgate form documents so much that notice is a minor value? The
substantive contract policy scheme suggested-transactional, market
functioning, relief-of-hardship, and social planning-helps focus attention on these crucial questions. Then we cannot forget the demands of our kind of legal system. Finally, we need data about the
likely consequences of proposals and the actual consequences of
legal action. If we lack this, we have to consider the risks of shooting
in the dark. Sometimes this is the only sensible course open; often
it is not. If it must be done, the risk can be minimized by adopting
approaches that particularize rather than approaches that work like
a shotgun.

